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-SUMMARY 
The shareholders in general meeting and board of directors are the main governing 
organs of a company. Control of the general meeting theoretically ensures control of 
the composition of the bo~rctoLdirectors who are usually empowered by the articles 
to manage the day-to-day administration of the company. The company acts by 
shareholders and directors voting and passing resolutions in general meeting and 
board meetings respectively. Controlling sufficient votes to pass resolutions in general 
and board meetings is therefore the essence of corporate control. A shareholder's 
--t,,right to vote in general meeting is a proprietary legal right, severable from the other 
incidents of share ownership. By aggregating voting rights, or limiting the scope of the 
voting rights of some shareholders, or restricting ownership of voting rights to certain 
specified persons, voting control in the general meeting may be acquired. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In order to understand the concept of corporate control1 it is necessary to first 
analyse the two main governing organs of the company, namely the-.board_of 
pJreqlgrs2 and the shareholders in general me~!ing.3 Secondly, it is necessary to 
analyse the articles of association of a company and the division of managerial 
powers between these two organs. 4 The ultimate control in a company is 
exercisable by the shareholders voting for and passing special resolutions in 
general meeting. 5 Every shareholder who is a registered member of the company 
is entitled to attend and vote at general meetings. 6 The effectiveness of the control 
conferred by the right to vote depends on the terms of the articles and of any 
contract entered into by the shareholders in respect of this right. 
. It will be submitted that in order to acquire control in a company it is necessary to 
either acquire ownership of or control of the required majority of shares, 7 or to 
acquire de facto control in the company,8 or to acquire control of the management 
of the company. Often, the board of directors, who control the day-to-day 
administration of the company also exercise control over the general meeting 
either through the proxy-making machinery9 or through control of or ownership of 
the required majority of shares in the company. Furthermore, it will be submitted 
that the decision whether to acquire ownership of the shares or control of the 
management will depend on the size of the company and the number of 
shareholders of the company. 
1 See 2.4 below. 
2 See 2.1.1 below. 
3 See 2.1.2 below. 
4 See 2.1.3 below. 
5 See 2.2 below. 
6 See 2.3 and 2.1.2 below. 
7 See 2.3 below. 
8 See 4 below. 
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The various forms of control discussed below 10 may be categorised into legal 
2. 
and de facto 12 forms of control. The legal forms of control arise either from 
ownership of shares13 or from the articles14 or ex contractu.151t will be submitted 
that shareholders' rights contained in an agreement provide shareholders with 
greater protection than the articles, but are also subject to greater abuse. 
9 See 3.3.3 below. 
10 See 3 and 4 below. 
11 See 3 below. 
12 See 4 below. 
13 See 2.2, 3.1and3.4 below. 
14 See 3.2 below. 
15 See 3.2 below. 
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3. 
Chapter 2 - Control of a company 
2.1 The governing organs of a company 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A company as a separate juristic entity is created when the prescribed 
documents have been lodged with the Registrar of Companies 1, the 
prescribed fees, duties and taxes have been paid, and the memorandum of 
association2 and articles of association3 have been registered with the date 
and certificate of registration endorsed thereon by the Registrar. 4 
A company is a statutory fiction which cannot act on its own,5 but can only 
act through human agents properly authorised so to act in terms of its 
articles. 6 The governing organs, 7 whose acts are deemed to be those of the 
company, and whose powers, rights and duties are set out in the articles, are 
inter alia the board of directors8 and the shareholders9 in general meeting.10 
The role of the board of directors is often only supervisory in nature, as 
extensive powers may be delegated in terms of the articles to a managing 
director,11 single directors, managers or other officers of the company.12 
Hereafter referred to as "the Registrar". 
Hereafter referred to as "the memorandum". 
Hereafter referred to as "the articles". 
S 63(1), s 64(1) ands 65(1) of the Companies Act, 61of1973 hereafter referred to as "the Act". 
References to sections shall be references to sections of the Act. 
J T Pretorius (gen ed), PA Delport, Michele Havenga and Maria Vermaas Hahlo's South African 
Comoany Law through the cases 5th ed (1991) (''Hahlo'') 285; SJ Naude Die Regrnosisie van die 
Maatskao.UYdirekteur (1970) 46-7; Daimler Comoany Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co (Great 
Britain) Ltd {1916] 2AC 307 at 340 and 345. 
See 3.2 below; see J H Farrar, NE Furey, B M Hannigan and P Wylie Farrar's Comoany Law 2nd 
ed (1988) (''Farrar") for a discussion on the nature and effect of the articles. 
Farrar 311; Peter G Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) ("Xuereb") 52; L CB Gower, J B 
Cronin, A J Easson and Lord Wedderburn of Charlton Gower's Princioles of Modem Comoany 
Law 4th ed (1979) ("Gower") 139; PM Meskin (ed), MS Blackman, MD Glaser, IE Konyn and S 
F Mullins Henochsberg on the Companies Act 4th ed ( 1985) (''Henochsberg'') 272-3 and 325. 
See 2.2.1 below; the ''board" or "the directors" being the collective term used to designate the directors 
when they act together as such; R v Kritzinger 1971(2)SA57 (A) at 59. 
The term ''shareholder" shall, for the purpose of this dissertation, mean the beneficial owner of the 
share who is registered as, or is deemed to be, a member of a company, unless the context indicates 
otherwise. 
See 2.2.2 below. 
G Leveson Comoany Directors Law & Practice ( 1970) (''Leveson '') 89; Lennard's Canying Co Ltd v 
Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AL 705; [1914 - 1915]ALL ER 280 (HL); Moresby White v 
Rangeland Ltd 1952 (4) SA 285 (SR). 
Hahlo 463- 5; Farrar 311; Gower 153.9. 
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2.1.1 
4. 
The board of directors 
Directors are the natural persons 1 who manage the day-to-day 
administration of the company.2 They are, in terms of the articles, 
empowered to exercise all the powers of the company except those 
powers which have to be exercised by the company in general meeting. 3 
--'""I Therefore any person who can appoint "nominee" directors, in other 
words, directors who will act in accordance with his instructions, 4 can at 
least influence and at most control absolutely the management of a 
company. 
A public company must have at least two directors, and a private 
company at least one. 5 Until directors are appointed, every subscriber to 
the memorandum shall be deemed for all purposes to be a director of 
the company. 6 A director must be appointed as a director before he may 
occupy the office of director.7 However, if there is some defect or 
irregularity in his appointment, this will not affect the validity of his acts, 
as he will then be regarded as a "de facto" director.8 A "director" means 
any person occupying the position of director or alternate director, by 
whatever name he may be designated. 9 Only in certain 
circumstances, 10 is a person in accordance with whose directions or 
instructions the directors of a company are accustomed to act, deemed 
to be a director. In England such a director is aptly termed a "shadow" 
director.11 
The power to appoint directors is usually conferred by the articles upon 
the shareholders in general meeting, 12 or upon a particular class of 
1 S 218(1)(a). 
2 Hahlo 327; Henochsberg 324; Xuereb 53. 
3 Hahlo 327; Fa"ar 311; see 2.1.3 below. 
4 See infra ''shadow directors". 
5 s 208(1). 
6 s 208(2). 
7 S 210; Henochsberg 9 and 325-7 .. 
8 S 214; R v Mall 1959 (4) SA 607 (N) at 622; Hahlo 329; Henochsberg 9. 
9 S I sv "director". 
10 See S 1(2). 
11 Hahlo 327 and 445. 
12 Hahlo 446; Fa"ar 311. 
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shareholder.13 It may also be conferred upon a third party either by the 
articles or by agreement between whoever can exercise such power 
under the articles and the third party.14 
A director may therefore be a mere puppet, 15 appointed and controlled 
by anonymous persons whose identity in practice is almost impossible 
to ascertain. The appointment as director by a third party, however, of a 
puppet or mere tool who has no idea what he is doing, is illegal and 
punishable as fraud.16 
For purposes of criminal law persons deemed to be directors also 
include any person who "controls or governs" a corporate body, or who 
is a member of a body or group of persons which "controls or governs" 
that corporate body or, where there is no such body or group, is a 
member of that corporate body.17 The concept of "control" is difficult to 
define.18 Control does not necessarily mean either complete or effective 
control,and may vary in meanings from merely guiding or influencing to 
commanding or ruling.19 
A director may vacate his office by failing to hold the specified number of 
qualification shares,20, resigning, removal by ordinary resolution,21 
disqualification22 or death. 
13 See 3.2.2footnote 1 below. 
14 Hahlo 330; Gohlke & Schneider v Westies Minerale (Edms) Bpk 1970 (2) SA 685 (A); Fisheries 
Development Cm:uoration v lo~enson 1980 ( 4) SA 156 (W); British Murac Syndicate Ltd v 
Alperton Rubber Companv Ltd {1915} 2 Ch 186; See 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 below. The terms 
"shareholder'~ "member'~ "director" and ''general meeting" in the text are used in relation to a 
company whereas the term "third party" is used to refer to any person linked to the company 
indirectly or not at all. 
15 Hahlo 445. 
16 HS Cilliers & ML Benade Cor:porate Law (1987) ("Cillier & Benade") 231; Henochsberg 391; 
Fisheries Development Cor:poration of SA Ltd v lo~enson 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) at 163; S v Shaban 
1965 (4) SA 646 (W) at 651-2; Sage Holdings Ltd v Unisec Group Ltd 1982 (1) SA 337 (W) at 354. 
17 S 332(10) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51of1977; S v Vandenbe~ 1979 (1) SA 208 (D) at 216-7; 
Hahlo 327, 498-450; Henochsberg 9. 
18 Pickering MA "Shareholder's voting rights and company control" (1965) 81 Law Quarterly Review 
(''Pickering") at 248. 
19 Hahlo 327; S v Marks 1965 (3) SA 834 (W) at 842. 
20 S 213(1)(a); Henochsberg 333. 
21 S 220; and see 2.1.3 below. 
22 Ss 218-9. 
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2.1.2 
6. 
The board of directors act as an autonomous23 governing organ of a 
company by the directors voting and passing resolutions at meetings of 
the board of directors of which proper notice must be given to all 
directors, and at which a quorum must be present.24 The articles usually 
stipulate the voting rights of the directors and the procedures to be 
followed at board meetings and confer upon the chairman of the board a 
casting vote in the event of a "deadlock".25 
The members in general meeting 
A "member" of a company is any person who is entitled to be registered 
in the company's register of members1and is, in fact, so registered.2 A 
person becomes entitled to be so registered by subscribing to the 
memorandum, 3 or by allotment4 or transfer of shares5 to him6 and will 
remain a member until his name is removed from the register. 7 
"Allotment" of shares is the appropriation of shares to a person by the 
company with the result that the person acquires the right to be included 
in the company's register of members in respect of the shares. 8 The 
company must keep a register of allotments. 9 Allotments of fully paid-up 
shares 1 O can be made by the directors only with the prior approval of 
the general meeting.11 It is also an offence for directors to authorise to 
23 Henochsberg 325. 
24 Hahlo 454; Leveson 58-9; Cillier & Benade 219; see 2.1.3 below. 
25 Cillier & Benade 219. 
1 Ss 105 - 115. A company cannot purchase its own shares - s 38, or be a member of itself - Trevor v 
Whitworth (1887) 12 AC 409 HL at 424, or be a member of its holding company - s 39, and see 
3.4.1 below. 
2 Hahlo 221; Henochsberg 166. 
3 s 103(1). 
4 S 103(2); Hahlo 249 - 257. 
5 See 1.3 below on the nature and meaning of "shares". 
6 Hahlo 220, 257 - 271. 
7 Hahlo 220; Brown v Nanco (Pty) Ltd 1976 (3) SA 832 (W), 1977 (3) SA 761 (W). 
8 s 103(2). 
9 s 93. 
10 s 69. 
11 S 221; Hahlo 250. 
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allot shares or debentures 12 to any director of the company or to his 
nominee or to any body corporate of which either such director or his 
nominee is a shadow director, or to a body corporate where such 
director or his nominee is entitled to exercise or control the exercise of 
one-fifth or more of the voting power at a general meeting, or to any 
subsidiary of such body corporate, unless, inter alia, the general meeting 
specifically approves the allotment.13 
A share is a bundle of incorporeal rights in personam 14 and consists of 
a right to dividends, capital and to vote. The share certificate issued by 
the company is prima facie evidence of the shareholder's title to the 
shares specified in it, but is not conclusive evidence.15 Shares are 
movable property transferable in the manner provided by the Act and the 
articles.16 There are three stages of a transfer of a share, namely, an 
agreement to transfer, the execution of a deed of transfer and, finally, the 
registration of the transfer .17 
Shares are transferred by means of a contract of cession and the 
cessionary will become owner of the shares on completion of the 
contract of cession provided the necessary intent to pass ownership is 
present.18 There is no necessity for the cedent to deliver the share 
certificate to the cessionary, or to execute a deed of transfer, or for the 
cessionary to have his name entered in the register of members for 
ownership of the shares to pass to him.19 
Failure to register the transfer of a share with the company has a number 
of important consequences: 
12 See 2.3 below for the meaning of "share" and 3.2.1 below for the meaning of "debenture". 
13 S 222(1)(a); see also s 222(1)(b), (c) and (d), ands 223. 
14 See 2.3 below. 
15 Hahlo 214 - 5. 
16 S 91; Hahlo 257. 
17 Hahlo 257; Henochsberg 150; Inland Property Development Cor.poration (PfJ'.) Ltd v Cilliers 1973 
(3) SA 245 (A) at 251. 
18 Henochsberg 166; Moosa v Lalloo 1957 (4) SA 207; leffezy v Pollak and Freemantle 1938AD 1 at 
22. 
19 Standard Bank ofS A Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1980 (2) SA 175 (T) at 180; Labuschagne v 
Denny 1963 (3) SA 538 (A). 
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2.1.2.1 
2.1.2.2 
2.1.2.3 
2.1.2.4 
8. 
The cessionary will not be registered as a member of the company 
and the name of the cedent will remain in the company's register of 
members. Accordingly, the register of members may not accurately 
record the names of the shareholders of a company.20 The 
cessionary may either retain his anonymity or apply to rectify the 
register of members and have his name recorded as a member 
therein.21 
Only the person whose name is entered as a member in the register 
of members will be regarded by the company as the person entitled 
to exercise the rights comprising the share.22 A shareholder whose 
name is not recorded in the register of members therefore cannot 
have his vote recorded in general meeting should he personally 
attend and vote. 23 
The existing share certificate will not be cancelled by the company 
and will reflect the name of the cedent of the share and not the name 
of the cessionary, or true owner, of the share.24 
Although a company has no right to enter into the question of the 
beneficial ownership of the shares, 25 the Minister of Industries, 
Commerce and Tourism can.26 In his investigation into who has an 
interest in the shares, the Minister has regard to any person who has 
the right to vote in respect thereof or is able materially to influence 
the exercise of such voting right.27 
A shareholder may therefore upon transfer of a share to him choose 
either to exercise his rights himself or to exercise them through another 
20 Hahlo 259 - 260; Henochsberg 166. 
21 S 115; Hahlo 210 - 3 and the authorities cited; Henochsberg 179-81. 
22 Hahlo 223, 259 - 260; Henochsberg 167; Pickering 250 footnote 7; Standard Bank of SA Limited v 
Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 (1) SA 276 (AD) at 289; Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining 
Company Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 666; Pender v Lushington ( 1877) 6 Ch D 70 at 78; Wise v 
Lansdell [1921] 1Ch420. 
23 See 2.3 below. 
24 Hahlo 215. 
25 Hahlo 221; Pender v Lu$hington ( 1877) 6 Ch D 70 at 78. 
26 S 1 sv ''Minister''; s 255(1); Hahlo 260. 
27 S 255(2); Henochsberg 405; Hahlo 260. 
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person. In order to exercise his rights against the company himself, a 
cessionary can claim delivery of the share certificate and completed 
transfer forms from the cadent of the share and register the transfer with 
the company, or he may apply to rectify the register of members, in 
which event he discloses his identity to the company and to the ~orld at 
large.28 The right of a shareholder to have his name entered in the 
register of members of a company is independent of the ownership of 
the shares.29 If, on the other hand, a shareholder wishes to remain 
anonymous, he could authorise another person, such as a nominee30 
or a trustee, 31 to be registered in his place. 
A shareholder of a public company can also retain his anonymity 
through the use of share warrants to bearer. A public company may, if so 
authorised by its articles, issue a warrant, termed a share warrant, stating 
that the bearer thereof is entitled to the shares or stock specified 
therein.32 The bearer of a share warrant may, if the articles so provide, 
be deemed to be a member either for all purposes or for such purposes 
as may be specified in the articles. 33 Therefore, if the articles do not so 
provide, the bearer of a share warrant will not be a member and will not 
be registered as such.34 The holder of a share warrant is a shareholder, 
but not necessarily a member, of a public company.35 
The reason why a private company cannot create share warrants to 
bearer is that it must restrict the right to transfer its shares36 and bearer 
shares are negotiable instruments which are freely transferable. 37 The 
transfer of shares of a private company are usually restricted by 
28 Ss 133ff; Hahlo 258; Moosa v La/loo 1956 (2) SA 237 (D) at 238. 
29 S 133(3); Hahlo 221; Henochsberg 179; Xuereb 16; Waja v O" 1929 TPD 865 at 871-872; Davis v 
Buffelsfontein Gold Mining Comoany Ltd 1967 ( 4) SA 631 (W); Jeffery v Pollak & Freemantle 1938 
AD 1at18. 
30 Hahlo 223; Henochsberg 167; a "nominee" is merely the agent of the shareholder, nominated by the 
shareholder, and registered as the member in the place of the shareholder; Sammel v President 
Brand Gold Mining ComoanyLtd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 666. 
31 See 3.3.2 below. 
32 S 101(1); Hahlo 186; Henochsberg 163 - 164; Gower 440 - 441. 
33 s 103(4); s 213(1)(b). 
34 s 105. 
35 Hahlo 221. 
36 S 20(1)(a); Hahlo 257 and 261; Henochsberg 163. 
37 S 101(2); Hahlo 186; Henochsberg 149; Webb Hale & Co v Alexandria Water Co Ltd (1905) 93 LT 
339KB. 
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10. 
providing in the articles for a right of pre-emption in favour of the existing 
shareholders. 38 The existing shareholders of a private company may 
agree to waive their right of pre-emption in favour of a third party who 
wishes to acquire shares in that company. Therefore, when a 
shareholder withdraws from the company he can offer all or some of his 
shares first to the remaining shareholders who, in terms of their 
agreement, will refuse the offer, then to the third party. The directors, 
however, have a discretion to refuse to register the transfer of the shares 
to the third party if the articles so provide. 39 
The division of powers 
Rights of corporate control1 are usually exercisable by the company in 
general meeting acting upon the votes of the shareholders, by the board 
of directors acting upon the votes of directors, and by the managing or 
executive directors in the exercise of the executive powers delegated to 
them.2 The relationship between the board of directors and the general 
meeting is contractual in nature3 and is based on the articles which 
determine the extent of the division of powers between the two 
governing organs. 4 
The general meeting is the primary and residual organ5 which can, by 
special resolution, 6 make major decisions regarding the structure and 
fate of the company. 7 The shareholder or shareholders, hereafter 
referred to as the "controlling shareholders", 8 who can muster sufficient 
38 Table B, articles 21-4; Hahlo 257 - 264 and the authorities cited; Rudolph de Brnin "The right of 
pre-emption - selling shares of private companies" (1979) 8 Businessman's Law 173. 
39 S 139; B G Pettet "Share Transfers and Pre-Emption Provisions" (1985) 48 The Modern Law 
Review 220 at 221 and 223-4; Farrar 151; Xuereb 130-2; Henochsberg 150. 
1 See 2.4 below. 
2 Pickering 248. 
3 Fa"ar 311; Henochsberg 100 and the authorities cited; Hahlo 113 and the authorities cited. 
4 Hahlo 446. 
5 Gower 152 and 556; Hahlo 288 - 290; Xuereb 55. 
6 See 2.2 below. 
7 Hahlo285. 
8 Nigel A Eastaway and Harry Booth Practical Share Valuation (1983) (''Eastaway & Booth) 17-8; 
!RC v B W Noble Ltd (1926) 12 TC 911at926. 
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votes to pass a special resolution in general meeting will control that 
general meeting and will have the power to, inter alia, 9 alter the 
memorandum 1 Oand the articles, 11 increase or reduce capital, 12 vary 
shareholders' rights, 13 convert any shares, whether issued or not, into 
shares of another class, 14, dispose of the undertaking or major assets of 
the company, 15 appoint and remove directors 16 and prescribe the 
rights and duties of directors in the articles. 
In theory, the general meeting could control the directors of the 
company if the articles so provided. Such control would be impracticable 
because the administration and control of a company should be vested 
in the hands of a small number of people who can meet at short notice, 
debate the company's problems and make quick decisions.17 The 
controlling shareholders determine the content of the articles 18 and 
prescribe the duties of the directors in the articles.19 The directors 
usually exercise in terms of the articles all the powers of the company 
except those powers which have to be exercised by the general 
meeting. 20 The board of directors therefore becomes the most 
important autonomous organ of control in the day-to-day administration 
of the company's affairs.21 
The general meeting usually retains few, if any, managerial powers and, 
except in matters specifically allotted to it, cannot direct the management 
of the company's affairs or overrule any decision arrived at by the board 
9 See Xuereb 64 - 67 where the powers exercisable by the general meeting are set out. 
10 S 55 ands 56. 
11 S 62; Fa"ar 111 - 121. 
12 S 75 ands 83. 
13 S 56(5) ands 102; cf s 252; Henochsberg 164 - 166. 
14 S 75(1)(i); Hahlo 194. 
15 s 228. 
16 s 220. 
17 Leveson 85. 
18 s 62. 
19 Hahlo 285. 
20 See 2.1.1 footnote 3 above. 
21 Pickering 248. 
ALL ER 582; Quin & Adens v Salmon [ 1909] AC: 442. 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
12. 
of directors in the conduct of the management of the company.22 
Therefore, although the general meeting has ultimate control, the extent 
and the effectiveness of its powers to manage the company can vary 
greatly, depending upon the provisions in the articles.23 
In theory only, and sometimes in practice, the "ultimate" control of the 
general meeting will lie in its ability to appoint24 and remove the 
directors, 25 thus giving it the power to control the composition of the 
board of directors. Nothwithstanding anything contained in the 
memorandum or articles, the general meeting can, by ordinary 
resolution, remove any director from his office before the expiration of 
that director's period of office.26 No provision in the memorandum or in 
the articles or in any agreement between the company and its directors 
which attempts to neutralise the power of the general meeting to remove 
directors by ordinary resolution, will be valid.27 There is, however, 
nothing to prevent the shareholders from agreeing with each other, either 
with or without the directors, not to remove directors by ordinary 
resolution but in some other way, for example, by a resolution requiring a 
higher percentage of votes than is required for an ordinary resolution, or 
in certain specified circumstances only.28 
Any resolution by the general meeting purporting to remove a director in 
a manner contrary to the manner set out in the shareholders' agreement 
would constitute a breach of that agreement. Section 220 of the Act only 
authorises the disregard of provisions in the articles and in agreements 
between the company and its directors which attempt to neutralise it, 
and should not be interpreted so as to authorise a breach of a 
shareholders' agreement. 29 
Farrar 311-3 and especially footnote 5; Gower 146; Hahlo 446; Xuereb 55-6; Shaw (John) & Sons 
(Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 at 134, [1935] ALL ER 456 at 464; Scott v Scott [1943] 1 
ALL ER 582; Quin &Axtens v Salmon [1909] AC 442. 
Pickering 248. 
S 209, s 210 ands 212. 
S 220; Farrar 307 - 10; Gower 148 - 9. 
S 220; and see 2.2 below. 
Henochsberg 348 and the authorities cited. 
See 2.3 below. 
Stewart v Schwab 1956 (4) SA 791 (T); Amoils v Fuel Transport (PO!,! Ltd 1978 (4) SA 343 (W) at 
347. 
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Not infrequently, however, the directors have complete control of the 
general meeting, either because they are majority shareholders or 
because they have control of the proxy voting machinery. 30 The 
reservation of the ultimate authority in the general meeting therefore 
seldom proves a real safeguard.31 Inevitably, in a large company with a 
widely dispersed group of shareholders, the directors will have control of 
the voting machinery, especially the proxy machinery.32 Therefore it is 
submitted that depending on the number of shareholders it may be 
advisable to acquire control of the management of the company, in other 
words, control of the board of directors, rather than to acquire ownership 
of the company, in other words, ownership of the shares. 
The general meeting is also vested with residual or default powers. 33 
This means that the general meeting can exercise all powers which are 
not delegated to the directors in terms of the articles, or if there are no 
directors or if the directors are incapacitated or otherwise unable to act, 
the general meeting can act in their stead. 34 
The general meeting can validate acts of the directors which are 
irregular, but are not illegal, ultra vires the company, or a fraud of the 
minority.35 Furthermore, the directors require prior approval of the 
general meeting for certain acts, such as the allotment or issue of 
shares. 36 If the directors of a company do not obtain the prior approval 
of the general meeting, the allotment or issue of shares will be invalid 
and may only be validated by the court. 37 The general meeting cannot 
validate the allotment or issue retrospectively.38 
30 Leveson 105. 
31 Leveson 85. 
32 The proxy form invariably invites the nomination of the directors for the purpose of exercising the 
absent shareholders vote; sees 189(5); Leveson 86. 
33 Farrar 312; Gower 147; Cillier & Benade 173 - 174 and the authorities cited. 
34 Hahlo 288-9; Bamford v Bamford {1970] Ch 212; [1969] 1 ALL ER 969 (CA) at 237-8; Barron v 
Potter [1914] 1 Ch at 903. 
35 Cilliers & Benade 173; Farrar 313. 
36 s 221. 
37 s 97. 
38 Henochsberg 350. 
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Ordinary and special resolutions 
The company acts through the general meeting by the shareholders voting 
for and passing ordinary or special resolutions in general meeting. The courts 
will not overturn a resolution validly passed or interfere with the internal 
management of companies acting within their powers unless a fraud has 
been perpetrated upon the minority.1 It is essential for the acquisition of 
control in a company to understand how a valid special resolution can be 
passed. 
There are certain statutory requirements for the passing of valid ordinary and 
special resolutions. 2 Resolutions are passed at general meetings of 
shareholders, which, subject to the articles, may be held from time to time.3 
Usually the articles confer the power to convene general meetings on the 
directors.4 However, two or more shareholders holding not less than 
one-tenth of the issued share capital may call a general meeting. 5 The 
directors are also obliged to call a general meeting on the requisition of one 
hundred shareholders or of shareholders holding not less than one-twentieth 
of its voting capital. 6 If the directors fail to call the general meeting the 
requisitionists may call the meeting themselves. 7 The Registrar& and the 
court9 may also call meetings of shareholders. Therefore the shareholders 
are not entirely dependent upon the directors to call a general meeting. 
• Unless the articles otherwise provide, notice of meetings must be served on 
shareholders in the manner prescribed in Table A art 35 or Table Bart 34 of 
Schedule 1, whichever is applicable.1 O Twenty-one days notice is required 
for the passing of a special resolution, and fourteen days for the passing of 
an ordinary resolution.11 The articles may prescribe longer but not shorter 
periods of notice 12 but a majority of shareholders holding not less than 95 
1 Leveson 79; Gundelfinger v African Textile Manufacturers Ltd & Others 1939 AD 314. 
2 Hahlo290. 
3 s 180. 
4 Table A art 34, Table B art 33. 
5 s 180(2). 
6 s 181. 
7 s 181(3), (4). 
8 s 182. 
9 s 183. 
10 s 187. 
11 s 186. 
12 s 186(1)(b). 
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per cent of all the total voting rights may agree to have a meeting called on 
shorter notice.13 Failure to give notice as required to all registered 
shareholders renders the meeting and any resolutions passed at it invalid, 
provided that notice need only be given to shareholders within reasonable 
reach, 14 and a defect in giving notice can be cured by the consent of all the 
shareholders of the company .15 
Every shareholder is entitled to attend, speak, vote and propose 
amendments.16 Unless the articles provide for a greater number of 
shareholders to constitute a quorum, the, quorum for general meetings shall 
be, in the case of a public company, three shareholders entitled to vote, 
personally present, and in the case of a private company having more than 
one shareholder, two shareholders entitled to vote, present in person or by 
proxy, and in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary company, the 
representative of the holding company .17 Where a private company has only 
one shareholder, such person present in person or by proxy, constitutes the 
meeting.18 
Ordinary resolutions are passed by a simple majority of the shareholders 
present and entitled to vote at a meeting, and take effect as from the date on 
which they are passed.19 
There are four requirements for the passing of a valid special resolution.20 
Firstly, not less than 21 clear days notice must be given to the shareholders 
specifying the intention to propose the resolution as a special resolution and 
what the terms and effect of the resolution and the reasons for it are. 21 A 
resolution may, with the written consent of all the shareholders, be passed as 
a special resolution at a meeting of which the 21 days notice has not been 
given.22 Secondly, a general meeting of shareholders must be held.23 
13 s 186(2). 
14 Majola Investments (Pty) Ltd v Uitzi(d Properties (PIJ!.) Ltd 1961 ( 4) SA 705 (T). 
15 Hahlo 290 and the authorities cited. 
16 Hahlo 295 and the authorities cited. 
17 S 190; Hahlo 295. 
18 s 184. 
19 S 203(2); Hahlo 296. 
20 S 199 read withs 200; Hahlo 352, and 295 - 308; Swerdlow v Cohen 1977 (3) SA 1050 (T) at 1053. 
21 S 199(1); see also s 199(3). 
22 s 199(3A). 
23 S 199(1); Hahlo 127 and 322- 326. 
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Thirdly, at the meeting, not all the shareholders need be present. Only 
shareholders holding in the aggregate not less than one-fourth of the total 
votes of all the shareholders entitled to vote thereat, must be present in 
person or by proxy at the meeting.24 Therefore shareholders holding 
three-fourths of the total votes of all the shareholders entitled to vote may be 
absent! The shareholders who are present must pass a resolution on a show 
of hands or by poll. If the special resolution is passed on a show of hands, 
the applicable principle is "one hand one vote•,25 and it must be passed by 
not less than three-fourths of the number of shareholders who are entitled to 
vote on a show of hands at the meeting who are present in person or by 
proxy. Where a poll has been demanded,26 the resolution must be passed 
by not less than three-fourths of the total votes to which the shareholders 
present in person or by proxy are entitled on a vote by poll. In order to pass a 
special resolution in a company by poll, therefore, only three-sixteenths of the 
total votes are required. This "required majority" will increase depending upon 
the number of shareholders attending general meetings. Fourthly, the special 
resolution must be lodged with the Registrar within one month after it was 
passed and registered before it has legal effect. 27 
Although it is accepted that intra vires acts which can be authorised by the 
company in general meeting by ordinary resolution can also be authorised by 
the informal unanimous assent of all the shareholders,28 the position as 
regards special resolutions is not equally clear. 
It is submitted that the Registrar can only register a special resolution if the 
company lodges with him a copy of the resolution,29 together with either a 
copy of the notice convening the meeting concerned, or a copy of the 
consent to waive such notice. 30 The Registrar cannot register a special 
resolution if the shareholders did not hold a meeting to pass the resolution 
24 S 199(1)(a). 
25 s 197(1). 
26 s 198. 
27 s 200. 
28 Hahlo 322 and the authorities cited; Gohlke and Schneider v Westies Minerale (Edms) Bgk 1970 
(2) SA 685 (A). 
29 Form CM26. 
30 S 199(3A); form CM25A. 
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and, it is submitted, that fact is brought to his attention.31 It is submitted that 
the shareholders cannot act as an organ of the company by informal 
unanimous assent of the shareholders, or even in terms of a written 
shareholders agreement where all the shareholders are a party thereto, 
where the Act requires a special resolution.32 
2.3 The shareholders' right to vote 
A shareholder has an interest in the company entitling him, inter alia and 
subject to the memorandum and articles, to a share in the share capital of a 
company,1 to a share in the profits of the company, and to attend and vote at 
meetings of the company.2 
Usually the articles authorise the creation of different classes of shares, such 
as ordinary, preference or deferred shares. 3 The division between the various 
classes of shares is primarily based on the nature of the rights afforded by 
them in regard to dividends and participation in the distribution of capital on 
liquidation.4 A discussion of the nature of shareholders' rights to dividends 
and capital falls outside the scope of this work, which concentates on the 
shareholders' right to vote. 
Every issued share must entitle the holder thereof to attend, speak and to 
vote in general meeting.5 The shareholder, as beneficial owner of the share, 
is entitled to vote in general meeting. In the event that the shareholder is not 
the registered member, the company will disregard his vote should he attend 
and vote in general meeting, and have regard only for the vote of the 
registered member.6 In these circumstances, if the shareholder wishes to 
exercise his right to vote, he can demand registration of the transfer of the 
31 Fourie JSA ''Eenparige Toestemming en Spesiale Besluite" (1959) 52 THRHR 569; Hahlo 96 and 
326 and the authorities cited; Xuereb 54. 
32 Hahlo 465 ands 200. 
1 S 1 sv "share'~· Hahlo 186; Eastaway & Booth 15 - 7; Borland's Trustee v Steel Brothers & Company 
Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279 at 288; Liqµidators. Union Share Agenc;y v Hatton 1927 AD 240 at 250-1; 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) at 288. 
2 Hahlo 221; Cilliers & Benade 88 - 89. 
3 Eastaway & Booth 3 - 7; Cilliers & Benade 89 - 90. 
4 Hahlo 193. 
5 S 193; Hahlo 194. 
6 See 2.2.2 above. 
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shares to him and registration as a member,7 or he can appoint the 
registered member in respect of the shares he owns as his agent or proxy. 
A shareholder's right to vote has been described as a right of property& 
which he may exercise as he pleases according to his own wishes and 
private interests. 9 
A shareholder may therefore divide his votes and cast them in different ways, 
or he may abstain from voting. Often a minority group of shareholders is able 
to exercise effective voting control in a company because the majority 
shareholders either abstain from voting or, due to apathy, fail to vote.1 O 
A shareholder may also cast his vote as he wishes in respect of any 
resolution even where he has a particular interest in its subject-matter.11 A 
shareholder, unlike a director, owes no fiduciary duty to the company.12 
Even a director, as shareholder, may attend and vote in general meeting in 
his own interests like any other shareholder who is not a director.13 Where a 
director, as shareholder, casts his vote in general meeting for his own selfish 
purpose, and against the "interests of the company", it is submitted that he 
cannot be held to be in breach of his fiduciary duty which he, as director, 
owes to the company. It is only where he casts his vote as director in board 
meetings contrary to the interests of the company that he may be in breach 
of his fiduciary duty to the company.14 
7 See also s 115. 
8 Hahlo 308 and the authorities cited; Henochsberg 308; Xuereb 16; Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 
ChD at75. 
9 Hahlo 297; but cf Peter G Xuereb ''Voting Rights: A Comparative Review" (1987) 8 The Company 
Lawer at 16 where the author expresses the view, co"ectly it is submitted, that the concept that a 
shareholder's right to vote is a ''right of property" which a shareholder may exercise in his own 
interests, even where those conflict with those of the company, is an obstacle to the idea that priority 
should be given to the interests of a "company as a whole". 
10 JS McLennan "The case of the missing shareholders" (1980) 9 Businessman's Law 151 for a 
discussion of the problem of absentee shareholders; see also 3.2 below. 
11 Pickering 250 footnote 10 and the authorities cited; Hahlo 308; Sammet v President Brand Gold 
Mining Company Ltd (1969) (3) SA 629 (A) at 680. 
12 Hahlo 308 and the authorities cited; see also 3.2.4 footnote 3 below. 
13 Hahlo 308; Gundelfin~rvAfrican Textile Manufacturers Ltd 1939AD 314. 
14 Cilliers & Benade 234; Hahlo 377 and the authorities cited. 
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The company can in certain circumstances 15 acquire an interest in a 
contract made by a director on his own behalf. In this event the director 
cannot, as a shareholder, use his voting power to prevent the company from 
claiming the benefits of the contract.16 
A shareholder's freedom to vote in his own interests is not affected by the 
fact that he may control the majority of votes. Unlike directors, a controlling 
shareholder of a company owes no fiduciary duty to the company, 17 and 
neither directors nor shareholders owe any fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
of a company.18 It follows that shareholders can bind themselves by voting 
agreements to exercise their vote in any way they please, but directors 
cannot.19 
2.4 The concept of corporate control 
The legal consequences of the shareholders' right to attend, vote and pass 
ordinary and special resolutions in general meeting, is crucial to the notion of 
corporate control.1 In Daimler Company Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber 
Company (Great Britain) Ltd2, Lord Parker of Waddington, when dealing with 
the question of piercing the corporate veil on the ground of the "enemy 
character" of a company, had the following to say3: 
• ... I think that the analogy is to be found in control, an idea which, if not 
very familiar in law, is of capital importance and is very well understood 
in commerce and finance. The acts of a company's organs, its directors, 
manager, secretary, and so forth, functioning within the scope of their 
authority, are the company's acts and may invest it definitely with enemy 
character. It seems to me that similarly the character of those who can 
make and unmake those officers. dictate their conduct mediately or 
immediately. prescribe their duties and call them to account, may also 
15 S 234 read with s 235; and see Henochsberg 373 - 381 for a discussion on ss 234 - 240. 
16 Henochsberg 375; Cook v Deeks [1916] 1AC554 (PC) at 564 - 565; Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd 
[1976] 2 AL ER 268 (Ch); and Stewart v Schwab 1956(4) SA 791(T); but cf EB M Company Ltd v 
Dominium Bank {1937] 3 ALL ER 555. 
17 cf Xuereb 63; and see 3.3.4 footnote 3 below and footnote 12 above. 
18 Pickering 250 footnote 11; Gower 573; Hahlo 393; Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. 
19 Hahlo 297; Leveson 79; Greenwell v Porter [1902} lCh 530 at 535; Flecg v McCarthy & Flecg 1942 
CPD 109; and see 3.3.1 below. 
1 See 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 above. 
2 [1916] 2AC. 
3 At340. 
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be material in a question of the enemy character of the company. . . . For 
certain purposes a court must look behind the artificial persona - the 
corporation - and take account of and be guided by the personalities of the 
natural persons, the corporators ... ".4 
The controlling shareholders, or the persons who control the controlling 
shareholders, may wield sufficient voting power in general meetings to pass 
resolutions and thereby theoretically have the power to "make and unmake" 
the directors who control the day-to-day administration of a company. 5 This 
is the very essence of corporate control. Corporate control essentially 
denotes the relationship which exists when an individual or group of 
individuals, who are clearly identifiable in some respects and who may 
themselves be incorporated, exercise powers of direction and dominium over 
the affairs of a company. 6 
2.5 The definition of a "parent undertaking" in English Company Law 
The discussion of corporate control and the various lega11 and de facto2 
forms of control should be viewed against the background of the English 
definition of corporate control. The English Companies Act 1989 has 
introduced a definition3 of "parent undertaking" and "subsidiary undertaking" 
which is much wider than the South African definition of "holding", 
"subsidiary", "controlling" and "controlled" companies. The English 
formulation now includes forms of de facto control, 4 thus offering a more 
realistic formal recognition of the exercise of control by one undertaking over 
another.5 
4 My underlining. 
5 See Fa"ar at 311 where he says: " ... the extent to which the shareholders can realistically be regarded 
as electing the directors, given the board's control of the proxy machinery, must always be open to 
question. In fact boards often become self-perpetuating". 
6 Pickering 248. 
1 See 3 below. 
2 See 4 below. 
3 See s 21 of the Companies Act; 1989. 
4 See ss 258(2)(c) and 258(4) of the Companies Act; 1985. 
5 An ''undertaking" is not only a "company'~ cf 3.4.1 below and the South African definition of 
''holding com.POnv" and "subsidiary company". 
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Section 21 of the Companies Act, 1989 replaces section 285 of the 
Companies Act, 1985 and reads as follows: 
"258(1) The expressions 'parent undertaking' and 'subsidiary 
undertaking' in this Part shall be construed as follows; and a 
'parent company' means a parent undertaking which is a 
company. 
258(2) An undertaking is a parent undertaking, in relation to another 
undertaking, a subsidiary undertaking, if -
(a) it holds a majority of the voting rights in the undertaking, or 
(b) it is a member of the undertaking and has the right to 
appoint or remove a majority of its board of directors, or; 
(c) it has the right to exercise a dominant influence over the 
undertaking -
(i) by virtue of provisions contained in the undertakings 
memorandum or articles, or 
(ii) by virtue of a control contract, or 
(d) it is a member of the undertaking and controls alone, 
pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders or 
members, a majority of the voting rights in the undertaking. 
258(3) For the purpose of subsection (2) an undertaking shall be 
treated as a member of another undertaking -
(a) if any of its subsidiary undertakings is a member of that 
undertaking, or 
(b) if any shares in that other undertaking are held by a person 
acting on behalf of the undertaking or any of its subsidary 
undertakings. 
258(4) An undertaking is also a parent undertaking in relation to 
another undertaking, a subsidiary undertaking, if it has a 
participating interestl> in the undertaking and -
(a) it actually exercises a dominant influence over it, or 
(b) it and the subsidiary undertaking are managed on a unified 
basis." 
The English definition of "parent undertaking" includes legal and de facto 
forms of control exercised by a company, a partnership, a close corporation, 
or an unincorporated association carrying on a trade or business with or 
without a view to profit, such as a trust, over another company. 7 
6 A ''participating interest" means an interest held by an undertaking in the shares of another 
undertaking which it holds on a long tenn basis for the purpose of securing a contribution to its 
activities by the exercise of control or influence arising from or related to that interest - see s 260( 1) 
of the Companies Ac~ 1985 inserted by s 22 of the Companies Act, 1989. There is a rebuttable 
presumption that a holding of 20 per cent or more of the shares of an undertaking shall be a 
''participating interest" - see s 260(2) of the Companies Ac~ 1985, inserted by s 22 of the Companies 
Ac~ 1989. 
7 S 260( 1) of the Companies Ac~ 1985 inserted bys 22 of the Companies Ac~ 1989. 
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Chapter 3 - Legal forms of control 
Any form of control which is based on rights and duties enforceable in a court of 
law, may be termed a "legal" form of control.1 A shareholder's statutory right to 
vote,2 conferred by the articles upon the shareholder, is proprietary in nature and is 
enforceable.3 A shareholder may supplement the articles by agreement and 
transfer his right to vote to a third party, while retaining for himself only his rights to 
capital and dividends. The third party's right to vote thus arises ex contractu and 
not from the articles.4 
There are a number of advantages to containing the right to vote in an agreement 
supplementary to the articles. 5 Firstly, the right to vote is one of the bundle of rights 
constituting the share which is normally transferred with the share in the hands of 
successive owners. A contractual right to vote, however, exists only for as long as 
the person is a party to the contract. Secondly, the articles are alterable by special 
resolution, and the rights therein contained may be modified or destroyed by the 
controlling shareholders. 6 A contract, on the other hand, can only be altered or 
cancelled by the consent of all the parties to the contract. Thirdly, any right 
contained in the articles to be valid must be within the scope of the legislative 
authority given by the Act to a company over its shareholders, whereas a contract 
is subject merely to the general provisions of the law of contract. A shareholder 
may therefore take upon himself by contract with the company many obligations 
which could not be imposed upon him by the company in the articles. 7 
There are three ways in which voting control in a company may be achieved, 8 
namely, by: 
1 Pickering 249. 
2 s 193. 
3 Xuereb 16; Pender v Lushington ( 1877) 6 Ch D 70. 
4 See 3.3 below. 
5 Fa"ar 122 - 129; Hahlo 127 and the authorities cited; Shalfoon v Cheddar Valley Co-Operative 
Daizy Co Ltd [1924] NZLR 561. 
6 See 2.2 above ands 62. 
7 Hahlo 127 - 128 and the authorities cited. 
8 Pickering 249; see, for example, 3.3.2 below. 
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acquiring ownership of, or control over, the shares with the required majority 
of voting rights; 
restricting the voting rights of some of the shareholders, thereby 
concentrating the voting rights among others; or 
3. aggregating the required majority of existing voting rights of the shareholders 
under the control of one group or person. 
The various legal forms of shareholders' voting control may be grouped into five 
major categories,9 namely, proprietary contro1,10 control by constitutional 
means, 11 inter-shareholder control arrangements, 12 inter-company control 
arrangements 13 and the management contract.14 
3.1 Proprietary control 
The most obvious method of acquiring control in a company is by acquiring 
ownership of the required majority 1 of voting rights of the shareholders of the 
company, either by acquiring the ownership of the shares, or by merely 
acquiring the rights to vote. Although the latter acquisition may be less 
expensive than the former, problems arise in connection with the exercise of 
the right to vote when the owner of that right is not the registered member as 
only the votes of registered members have legal effect. 2 Therefore the 
purchaser of the votes or of the shares must ensure that the sellers thereof 
either remain as registered members and vote in accordance with his 
instructions or that he be registered as a member. 
9 Pickering 249. 
10 See 3.1 below. 
11 See 3.2 below. 
12 See 3.3 below. 
13 See 3.4 below. 
14 See 3.5 below. 
1 See 2.2 above. 
2 See 2.1.2 above; cf Fan-ar 311. 
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A straightforward purchase of the shares is more easily achieved where there 
are few shareholders and where the register of members accurately reflects 
the addresses and names of the shareholders. Where the number of 
shareholders increase and the register of members reflects nominee 
members, it becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to trace the 
shareholders in order to purchase their shares. 3 In these circumstances, it 
would be advisable to adopt one of the other legal forms of control. 
3.2 Control by constitutional means 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Upon registration the company's memorandum and articles bind the 
company and its shareholders to the same extent as if they had respectively 
been signed by each shareholder, to observe all the provisions of the 
memorandum and of the articles.1 The memorandum and articles constitute 
a contract between the company and its shareholders, gua shareholders, as 
well as between the shareholders inter se; a non-shareholder or a 
shareholder not registered as a member acquires no rights under the 
articles.2 
The articles, being subordinate to the memorandum3 are its "by-laws". 4 The 
controlling shareholders may prescribe in the articles capital structures in 
which their voting control is concentrated to a greater or lesser extent. 
Pickering 251 footnote 12. 
s 65(2). 
Hahlo 113; Henochsberg 100 - 101; Cilliers & Benade 56 - 59; Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh . 
Sheep-Breeders Association {1915] 1 Ch 881 at 900; Gohlke and Schneider v Westies Minerale 
(Edms) Bpk 1970 (2) SA 685 (A); De Villiers v Jacobsdal Salt Works (Michaelis and De Villiers) 
(P()!) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 873 (O); Ross/are (P()!) Ltd v Registrar of Companies 1972 (2) SA 524 (D); 
but cf P J J Olivier ''Die Grondslag van maatskappy- gebondenheid aan die akte van oprigting en die 
statute en in verband daannee rektifikasie" (1989) THRHR 409 where the author discusses the 
curious nature of the "contract" between the company, a legal fiction, and its members. 
Quadrangle Investments (Pt;y) Ltd v Witind Ho/din~ Ltd 1975 (1) SA 572 (A) at 579. 
Hahlo 92. 
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The controlling shareholders have almost complete freedom to establish 
classes of share capital conferring, restricting, or denying entirely, various 
rights in respect of dividends, capital and voting. The freedom of the 
controlling shareholders to amend the articles as they wish is tempered by 
the statutory safeguard created for the benefit of oppressed shareholders in 
section 252 and by the tenets of minority protection in terms of the common 
law.5 
There are five ways of arranging the capital structure of a company in the 
articles which will have the effect of concentrating or dispersing the voting 
control of the shareholders. These five arrangements are termed capital 
gearing, 6 vote gearing, 7 loading votes, 8 class powers of appointment of 
directors9 and class powers of general management.1 O 
Capital gearing 
Capital gearing is the arrangement of equity share capita11 and loan 
capita12 of a company in such a way that the contributors of loan capital 
do not participate in the management of the company. A company 
wishing to raise capital has a choice between issuing equity shares or 
issuing debentures. 3 
A company, if so authorised by its memorandum or by its articles, may 
create and issue debentures. 4 A debenture is a formal acknowledgment 
5 Hahlo 506 - 565 and especially at 530 for a general discussion on majority rule and minority 
protection; Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 67 ER 189; Prudential Assurance ComJJanv Ltd v 
Newman Industries Ltd (No2) [1980] 2ALL ER 841 (Ch); [1982] 1Ch204; [1982] lALLER 354 
(CA). 
6 See 3.2.1 below. 
7 See 3.2.2 below. 
8 See 3.2.3 below. 
9 See 3.2.4 below. 
10 See 3.2.5 below. 
1 "Equity share capital" and "equity shares" in relation to a company, means its issued share capital 
and shares excluding any part thereof which, neither as respects dividends nor as respects capita~ 
carries any right to participate beyond a specified amount in a distribution - s 1 sv "equity share 
capital" and "equity shares". 
2 Ss 116 - 130; Eastaway & Booth 7. 
3 F<mar 134; Pickering 251. 
4 s 116. 
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of debt by a company to its creditor.5 The company will issue a 
debenture deed to the creditor.6 Debenture holders' names are 
recorded in the company's books. 7 They have a personal right against 
the company for the return of their capital and interest, which rights are, 
like those of shareholders, of contractual effect and are usually set out in 
the debenture deed. 8 
The degree of control exercised by shareholders and debenture holders 
over management depends on the terms of the articles. 9 The articles 
can provide that shareholders alone, or that shareholders and debenture 
holders, have the power to appoint directors. If the articles empower 
debenture holders to appoint directors, then the control of the 
shareholders over the management of the company would be less 
effective. Any nominee director appointed by a debenture holder may 
exercise his vote at board meetings to protect the assets securing the 
loan made by the debenture holder,10 or may prevent mismanagement 
of the other directors or at least report such mismanagement to the 
debenture holder who can then take appropriate action to protect his 
security. 
Debenture holders are not shareholders and cannot vote at general 
meetings. They are therefore unable to exert any direct influence over the 
general meeting.11 Although the debenture holders may be deprived of 
the opportunity of influencing the management of the company through 
the general meeting they can exert a dominant influence over the board 
of directors if they loan capital to the company on the condition that they 
be entitled to appoint directors or that they be entitled to call up the loan 
at any time. Usually only a debenture holder making a large loan to the 
company is in a powerful enough position to insist on these conditions 
being included in the terms of the loan agreement. 
5 Fa"ar 135; Hahlo 215; Coetzee v Rand Sporting Club 1918 WLD 74. 
6 S 126; F~ar 135. 
7 Ss 128-9. 
8 S 126; F~ar 135; Hahlo 215-9; Gower 559-560. 
9 See 2.1.3 above. 
10 Cilliers & Benade 231 footnote 14. 
11 Fa"ar 216. 
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The normal contractual remedies of a creditor, for example, the 
contractual right of the debenture holder to call up his loan should the 
company default on repayment and place the company in liquidation if it 
is unable to pay its debts, 12 are always available to the debenture 
holder 13 and may also influence directors and shareholders of a 
company when they exercise their respective rights to vote. 
The only real difference between shareholders and debenture holders in 
relation to their ability to manage a company, is one of degree, namely, 
that of the relative effectiveness of the powers of participation or 
intervention in the company's management which the various classes of 
contributors have at their disposal. Often, though, the debenture holders 
do not participate in the management of the company because they do 
not, or cannot, insist on acquiring the power to appoint one or more 
directors to the board of directors. Therefore, by attracting capital in this 
manner, the company can concentrate the power to manage the 
company in the hands of shareholders only. 
3.2.2 Vote gearing 
12 Ss 345-6. 
13 Ftln'ar 216. 
Whereas capital gearing is used to exclude creditors from participating in 
the management of a company, vote gearing is used to restrict the 
voting power of one class of shareholder 1 in such a way that, as 
between various classes of shareholders, voting control is concentrated 
in only one class. The voting rights of shareholders of a particular class 
of shareholders are equal as between those shareholders, 2 but the 
voting rights between the different classes of shareholders may differ. 3 
1 Hahlo 207; the term "class of shareholders" is defined in Sovereit:n Life Assurance Comuany v 
Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573 (CA) at 583: "The term 'class .. .' must be confined to those persons whose 
rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their 
common interest". 
2 S 193; Hahlo 194. 
3 s 75; s 195. 
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It is submitted that the controlling shareholders of large companies with 
many shareholders may effectively use the method of issuing preference 
shares with limited voting rights in order to raise capital while at the same 
time retaining voting control. Vote gearing is a simple method of 
arranging the balance of voting power amongst different classes of 
shareholders. The memorandum, or more usually the articles, will 
authorise the creation of different classes of shares. 4 The controlling 
shareholders may create a class of share, such as preference shares, 
with limited voting rights. 5 Such voting rights become effective and the 
preference shareholders are only entitled to vote in general meeting in 
certain defined circumstances.& However, preference shareholders may 
not vote for the appointment or removal of a director, or for any 
proposed variation of rights attached to another class of shares. 7 
If authorised by the articles, the controlling shareholders may by special 
resolution convert any class of shares into shares of another class. 8 
Thus, a class of ordinary shares with an unlimited right to vote may be 
converted into a class of preference shares, with a limited right to vote. 
The balance of voting control may thus be re-arranged amongst the 
various classes of shareholders. The new class of preference 
shareholders can therefore be excluded from voting control. 9 
The rights of shareholders, however, may be contained in the 
memorandum in which event those rights cannot be altered except in the 
manner prescribed in the memorandum, 10 or by way of a compromise 
4 Hahlo 193; see 1.3 above. 
5 s 194(1). 
6 For example, where a proposed resolution directly affects the rights attached to the preference shares, 
or where it affects the interests of the preference shareholders, or where a resolution for the winding 
up of the company or for the reduction of its capital is proposed (S 194(1)(b)), or when payment of 
the stipulated preference dividend is in a"ear (S 194(1)(a). 
7 Pickering 253 footnote 19; Utopia Vakansie-Oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A) at 178. 
8 S 75(1)(i); cf S 252(2)(c). 
9 Hahlo 193; P A Delport Die Verlqyging van Kapitaal in die Suid-Afrikaanse MaatskqpJ!Yreg met 
spesifieke vemysing na die Aanbod van Aandele aan die Publiek unpublished LLD thesis, 
University of Pretoria (1987) 127 ff. 
10 s 56(5). 
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or arrangement.11 Voting rights of shareholders contained in the articles 
may be altered by special resolution,12 or alternatively, only with the 
consent of a specified proportion of the holders of the issued shares of a 
particular class of shareholder, or a resolution sanctioning the variation 
passed at a separate meeting of the holders of those shares.13 
An issue of shares, or the creation and issue of a new class of shares, or 
a sub-division of existing shares 14 does not constitute a variation of the 
voting rights of the existing shareholders merely because there is a 
re-arrangement of the balance of voting power between the 
shareholders.15 Any application by an aggrieved shareholder under 
section 252 in these circumstances will probably fail. 
Both vote gearing and capital gearing either concentrate voting rights or 
disperse voting rights in the company. The former effect is more 
common.16 
Loading votes 
Whereas vote gearing limits the voting rights of a particular class of 
shareholders, such as preference shareholders, the method of loading 
votes concentrates voting rights on a particular class of shareholders. 
11 S 311; Hahlo 207. 
12 s 62. 
13 Table A art 7; Table Bart 9. 
14 See 3.3.1 below for a discussion on the effect and meaning of a scheme of sub-division. 
15 Hahlo 207; White vBristolAeroplane Company Ltd [1953] Ch 65; {1953] lALL ER 40. 
16 Pickering 253. For example, the capital of a company may be divided equally between debentures 
on the one hand and preference shares and ordinary shares on the other. The ratio of share capital 
to loan capital is therefore 1:1. The capital gearing will be 4:1 because one-fourth of the capita~ 
namely the ordinary shares, controls capital four times its size. By gearing the votes so that the 
preference shareholders have limited voting rights, the ordinary shareholders control assets four times 
greater in value than the total nominal ordinary capital. If, however, the preference shares were also 
to have unconditional voting rights, then the balance of voting power between the two classes of 
shareholders would be equal. 
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Every issued share must include a right to vote.1 "Non-voting" shares are 
not permitted. Furthermore, voting rights of each share of a class of 
shares must be equal.2 A private company may, however, load voting 
rights onto a particular class of shares, which will result in the other 
classes of shares effectively becoming "non-voting shares". 3 
The controlling shareholders may provide in the articles that the votes to 
which any new shareholder or new class of shareholders is entitled 
above a stated number increase, not in direct proportion to the number 
of shares held, but in either a lower or higher proportion.4 If the votes 
increase in a lower proportion, the articles may further provide that no 
shareholder shall be entitled to more than a specified number of votes. 5 
Any shareholder holding more than the specified number of shares will 
have no vote in respect of those shares. In other words, he will own 
"voteless shares". 6 The voteless shares will regain the vote if they are 
transferred to a person who, even with those shares, does not hold more 
than the limit. 7 
The use of loading votes to readjust the balance of voting control is 
particularly useful in company acquisitionsB and the controlling 
2 S 193; Hahlo 194; but sees 196, in terms of which s 193(1) does not apply to shares issued prior 
to 1 January 1974 which have no voting rights or unequal voting rights. 
3 S 195(2) read with s 193(1); Swerdlow v Cohen 1977 (3) SA 1050 (T) at 1053. For example, a 
private company may issue class ''.A" ordinary shares with 1 vote each and class ''B" ordinary shares 
with, say, 10 votes each. 10 class ''.A" ordinary shares will be required to neutralise 1 class ''B" 
ordinary share. Clearly, the class ''B" shareholders will exercise voting control in the company if an 
equal amount of shares in each class are issued. 
4 S 195(4)(b); For example, the articles may provide that the first 30 class ''B" ordinary shares issued 
or allotted by the company to any particular person will have, say, 10 votes per share, and thereafter, 
only 1 vote per share. 
5 S 195( 4)(b ); Henochsberg 306. 
6 Hahlo 195. 
7 Hahlo 195; B Venniker ''Disenfranchising a Shareholder? A comment on Sections 193 and 195 of 
the Companies Act" (1977) SALT at 94. 
8 For example, company A acquires the shares in company B and issues to the shareholders of 
company B, in consideration for the loss of their shares in company B, shares in company A. The 
voting rights of the shares in company A may be loaded in such a way that control is confe"ed on 
the existing class of shareholders of company A. The voting control in the companies may thus be 
conveniently readjusted after the acquisition of company B's shares. 
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shareholders of a private company with only a few shareholders can use 
the method of loading votes on their existing issued shares in order to 
retain control for themselves when issuing new shares to raise capital.10 
Class powers of appointment of directors 
The right to appoint directors to the board may be conferred in terms of 
the articles upon a particular class or particular classes of shareholders 
or upon a third party .1 Where the articles expressly so provide this may 
be a valid right enforceable by the courts.2 
Directors traditionally owe a fiduciary duty only to the company and not 
to any person who may appoint them in terms of the articles. 3 While the 
directors do not owe any duties to shareholders as such, the 
shareholders may appoint them specifically as their agents in any matter, 
in which case the directors will owe them the ordinary fiduciary duties 
arising from that agency relationship. 4 In order to remain in office, 
therefore, nominee directors will when carrying out their duties bear in 
mind the interests of the shareholders who appointed them. 5 
The right to appoint directors conferred on a class of shareholders in 
terms of the articles may be transferred by that class, or the controlling 
majority of that class, to a third party including a director. The third party 
can then appoint nominee directors to the board who will follow his 
instructions. In this manner the third party can acquire control of the 
board. In these circumstances the third party may be regarded as a 
"shadow" director. 6 
10 Pickering 253. 
1 See 2.1.1 above. 
2 British Murac Syndicate v A/uerlon Rubber Company Limited [1915] 2 Ch 186. 
3 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421; but cf Hahlo 376 and Fa"ar 325 - 9 and the authorities cited for 
the recent developments in Anglo-American law which indicate a trend towards imposing a fiduciary 
duty not only to the company, but also to shareholders, individually or as a group, to the general 
body of creditors when a company is insolvent or nearly insolvent, and even to employees in cerlain 
circumstances. 
4 Fa"ar 325 footnote 15. 
5 S 220; cf Fa"ar 311. 
6 See 2.1.1 footnote 11 above. 
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If the articles confer the right to appoint directors upon a class of 
shareholders, then the board of directors cannot exercise that right or 
transfer that right to a third party.7 If, on the other hand, the articles 
confer the right to appoint directors upon the board of directors, the 
board can transfer this right to a third party under a power of attorney. 
It is submitted that a company may become unmanageable in 
circumstances where the articles provide that the management of the 
company is the responsibility of the directors only, and that different 
classes of shareholders can appoint directors to the board. In these 
circumstances the board of directors will be responsible for the 
management of the company to the exclusion of the general meeting. 8 
Each nominee director will represent the interests of the class of 
shareholders who appointed him. The final forum for deciding matters 
affecting the management of the company is transferred, in terms of the 
articles, from the general meeting to the board, which now represents 
sectional interests. Thus the company may become unmanageable. The 
fiduciary duty of each nominee director to act in the best interests of the 
company as a whole might conflict with the personal interest, or 
contractual obligation, of the individual nominee directors to act in the 
interests of the class of shareholders who appointed them. 9 
Class powers of general management 
A provision in the articles which could make the company even less 
manageable than one providing that different classes of shareholders 
can appoint nominee directors, it is submitted, would be one providing 
7 Pickering 254 footnote 26; lames v Eve (1873) LR 6HL 335. 
8 See 2.1.3 above. 
9 Pickering 255, where he states that these circumstances would fonn the only exception to the general 
principle that in English company law the majority in general meeting have the ultimate powers of 
control; Hahlo 333; in Sa~e Holdin~s Ltd v The Unisec Groyp Ltd 1982 (1) SA 337 (W) at 354 
Goldstone J, in an obiter dictum. stated that directors appointed in this manner amounts to a 
''strategem" which is "foreign to the basic concepts of our law and [is J subversive of the proper 
exercise of their fiduciary duties by {the] directors'~· James North (Zimbabwe) (Pvt) Ltd v Mattinson 
1990 (2) SA 277 (ZHC). 
J 
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that different classes of shareholders are empowered to manage 
different aspects of the company's business. In order to co-ordinate the 
management of a company properly on an unified basis, the articles 
usually provide that the board of directors are solely responsible for the 
management of the company. It is unlikely to find in practice articles 
providing for general management powers to be divided among different 
classes of shareholders. One class of shareholder would then, for 
example, allocate the company's profits for each year either to the 
reserve fund or to the payment of dividends, while another class would 
manage some specific asset or part of the total enterprise. 
Such a division of management powers, if in fact it existed in a company, 
would be of specific interest to a third party wishing to acquire control of 
the company in question. The third party need only consider what aspect 
of the company he wished to control, which class of shares he would 
require for that purpose, and acquire only those shares. The day-to-day 
management of a company would be disrupted by any failure of the 
different classes of shareholders to co-operate with each other. For this 
reason, such a division of management powers between classes of 
shareholders is inadvisable. 
3.3 Inter-shareholder control arrangements 
In order to become part of the group of controlling shareholders, it is 
necessary for shareholders to group together and, by agreement, set up 
voting control arrangements between themselves or between themselves 
and a third party, or between themselves and the company. Unlike the 
control arrangements established in the articles, 1 these inter-shareholder 
control arrangements bind neither the company nor shareholders. who are 
not a party to them, are not public documents and can therefore be 
concealed from the public eye, 2 and can be amended only by the consensus 
of all parties to them, thus affording greater protection to the shareholders 
against oppression than the articles. 3 
1 Discussed in 3.2 above. 
2 Except perhaps the voting trnst; see 3.3.2 below. 
3 S 252; Fa"ar 122. 
j 
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There are three main forms of arrangement set up by shareholders to 
supplement the articles, 4 namely the voting agreement, 5 the voting trust6 
and the irrevocable proxy. 7 
Voting agreements 
A shareholder's right to vote is a proprietary legal right which is severable 
from the other incidents of share ownership.1 Shareholders may 
therefore enter into a "voting agreement" with any person in respect of 
their right to vote and may, in particular, agree to vote in support of any 
person, whether a shareholder or not.2 
It is submitted that before entering into a voting agreement with any 
person it is essential to ascertain whether that person is the shareholder 
or merely a nominee in respect of the shares he purports to hold. Where 
the registered member of a company is merely a nominee the third party 
should enter the voting agreement with the shareholder, not the 
nominee. 3 Furthermore, the shareholder should be required to warrant 
that his nominee will cast the relevant vote in the manner prescribed in 
the agreement. 
Entering into a voting agreement with the controlling shareholders is an 
ideal way for a third party to effectively acquire voting control in a 
company and to retain his anonymity. Thus, a director, in his capacity as 
a director, may enter into a voting agreement with the shareholders 
whereby the shareholders undertake to vote in accordance with that 
4 Fa"ar 123; Pickering 248; Xuereb Peter G ''Voting Rights : A Comparative Review" (1987) 8 
Company Lawer 16. 
5 See 3.3.1 below. 
6 See 3.3.2 below. 
7 See 3.3.3 below. 
1 See 2.3 and 3.1 above. 
2 Farrar 123 - 6. 
3 See 2.2 above. 
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director's instructions, or he may enter the agreement in his capacity as 
a shareholder and bind himself to vote in accordance with the terms of a 
voting agreement.4 In this way a director can acquire control of the 
general meeting, effectively entrenching himself as a director. 
Where the terms of the voting agreement otherwise conflict with the 
terms of the articles, the articles are not thereby amended, though to 
comply with the articles necessarily entails breach of the agreement. 5 
Where a shareholder votes contrary to his undertaking in the voting 
agreement the other parties to the voting agreement may enforce 
compliance in a court of law specifically, or may claim damages against 
the party in breach. 6 Furthermore, the company cannot be required to 
disregard the vote of the intransigent shareholder.7 The resolution 
passed at the particular general meeting will be valid and cannot, it is 
submitted, be set aside. 
Therefore, where a purchaser of shares is obliged in terms of the 
transaction to vote for, and not to oppose, the re-election of directors 
appointed by the seller of the shares, the courts may enforce such a 
provision specifically8 but have a discretion not to do so, 9 or it 
4 Greenwell v Porter {1902] 1 Ch 530 at 535. 
5 Scotmotors (Plant Hire) Ltd v Dundee Petrosea Ltd [1982] SLT 445; whether or not the 
shareholders inter se can contract against the alteration of the articles, for example, unless there is 
unanimous consent, is an open question (Farrar 120). It has been suggested (Farrar 120 footnote 4) 
that such a provision in the article does not deprive a company of its statutory power to alter the 
articles (S 62) but rather purports to contrive majorities for or against a resolution when the statutory 
power is being exercised. 
6 Hahlo 364- 5 and the authorities cited; Stewart v Schwab 1956 (4) SA 791 (T) at 793. 
7 Henochsberg 169; IRC v !Bibby & Sons Ltd {1945] 1 ALL ER 667 (HL) at 671; IRC v Silverts Ltd 
[1951] 1 ALL ER 703 (CA) at 708 - 709; and S Berendsen Ltd v IRC {1957] 2 ALL ER 612 (CA) 
at 621. 
8 Henochsberg 308 and the authorities cited. 
9 Esterhuizen v East Rand Crushers (Pty) Ltd 1968 (4) SA 281 (T). 
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may grant an interdict prohibiting the purchaser from voting in a manner 
contrary to his undertaking.10 Thus, where the shareholders are also 
directors, the court may refuse specific performance where to perform it 
would constitute interference with the bona fide exercise of their powers 
as directors.11 
The voting agreement is not binding on persons not a party to it.12 
Therefore the voting agreement cannot be enforced against a third party 
or a shareholder contracting with the board of directors or contracting 
with a general manager of the company, where the third party, the 
shareholder, the board and the general manager are not a party to it.13 
A voting agreement, like any other agreement, is governed by the 
general law of contract and the parties to it will be bound only by the 
express terms of their agreement.14 The courts will not generally enforce 
an implied term as a term of the voting agreement, such as an implied 
term that the parties to it would not put an end to the existing state of 
affairs.15 Herein lies the real danger inherent in any voting agreement for 
the contracting parties must expressly provide for every conceivable 
eventuality and contingency, lest a cunning shareholder escapes his 
obligations and thwarts the purpose of the agreement. The question 
whether a provision is express or implied is always one of construction. 
There are obvious ways a party may escape his obligations under a 
voting agreement. Firstly, if the voting agreement imposes an obligation 
on a shareholder to vote only in respect of whatever shares he owns 
from time to time then, in order to escape this obligation and end the 
10 Pickering 257; Stewart v Schwab 1956 (4) SA 791 (T),· Greenwell v Porter [1902] 1 Ch 530; 
Puddephatt v Leith [1916] 1 Ch 200. 
11 Cil/iers & Benade at 231footnote12; Coronation Syndicate Ltd v Lilienfield and the New Fortune 
Company Ltd 1903 TS 489 at 496 - 7; see 2.1.3 above. 
12 Gower 569; Greenhalgh v Mallard [1943] 2ALL ER 234 (CA). 
13 Hahlo 465; Peter G Xuereb ''Voting Rights: A Comparative Review" (1987) 8 Comgany Lawer 16; 
Scotmotors (Plant Hire) Ltd v Dundee Petrosea Ltd [1982] SLT 445. 
14 Hahlo 311; Greenwell v Porter [1902] 1 Ch 530 at 535. 
15 GreenhalpJi v Mallard [1943] 2ALL ER 234 (CA) at 240. 
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contract, the shareholder may dispose of all or most of his shares. The 
obligation of the parties to a voting agreement to vote in terms of the 
agreement will endure only in respect of whatever shares they might 
from time to time possess. By selling his shares, the shareholder is not in 
breach of the terms of the voting agreement, nor are the purchasers of 
the shares bound by the terms of the voting agreement16 unless the 
voting agreement includes an express provision to the effect that the 
parties to it are obliged to own a specified minimum number of shares 
with a specified minimum number of votes, or that the shares may only 
be transferred subject to the condition that the transferee, upon transfer 
of the shares to him, undertakes to vote in accordance with the 
provisions of the voting agreement. The express undertaking of the 
purchaser of the shares to restrict his right to vote and to vote in 
accordance with the terms of the voting agreement effectively restricts 
the transfer of shares to persons interested not in control of the 
management of the company, but only in a return on their investment in 
the form of dividends.17 
Secondly, there is nothing to prevent any person, whether a party to the 
voting agreement or not, from altering the voting strength of a particular 
class of shareholders or from interfering with the voting control which 
such agreement confers, unless the voting agreement contains an 
express provision precluding parties to it from doing so.18 
For example, a class of shares may be sub-divided.19 The number of 
shares held by each shareholder of that class of shares which is 
sub-divided will increase, causing the voting power of that class of 
shareholders to be effectively increased. In this way, the controlling 
shareholders can increase the voting power of any particular class of 
shareholder not a party to the voting agreement, thus diluting the voting 
16 Pickering 256; Hahlo 267; Greenhalgh v Mallard {1943) 2ALL ER 234 (CA) at 239 and 237. 
17 Consolidated Crusher Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Plen 1968 ( 1) PH A2 (T). 
18 Pickering 256; Greenhalgh v Ardeme Cinemas Limited {1946) 1 All ER 512. 
19 S 75(1)(e). 
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power of the shareholders who are party to the voting agreement. Only 
an express prohibiting provision in the voting agreement will prevent the 
shareholders implementing such a scheme of sub-division. 
A voting agreement will thus not be effective unless the parties to it can 
between them exercise sufficient voting rights to prevent the 
shareholders of the company from passing a special resolution in favour 
of a scheme which will weaken their collective voting strength.20 Thus, if 
the parties to a voting agreement do not stipulate for some permanence 
of control their position will be highly precarious and easily undermined. 
It is, however, not always possible to achieve certainty and effectiveness 
by providing expressly for all foreseeable eventualities and contingencies 
in a voting agreement. Although much care may be taken in drafting 
such an agreement in order to contend with as many eventualities as 
possible, a cunning protagonist will usually be able to find a way of 
undermining its collective voting strength. 
Voting trusts 
A voting trust involves the voting rights of all or some of the shares in a 
company being settled on trust.1 There are two types of trust, namely a 
"discretionary trust", where property is donated to and vests in the 
trustees to administer in terms of the trust deed, and a "vested trust", 
where property vests in the trust beneficiaries but is administered by the 
trustees in terms of the trust deed on behalf of the trust beneficiaries. 2 A 
trust is not a separate legal entity. 3 Only the discretionary trust, which is 
the more common form of trust in practice, will be dealt with below. 
20 Pickering 256 - 7. 
1 Farrar 126; Pickering 257. 
2 S 1 sv "trust" of the Trnst Property Control Act, 57 of 1988. 
3 Cilliers & Benade 3; Mawum Financial Holdings v Summerly 1984 (1) SA 160 (W) at 163. 
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A shareholder may transfer his shares4 to a trustee, who will acquire title 
to the shares and will be a registered member of the company, to be 
administered by the trustee in terms of a trust deed. The shareholder 
divests himself of his title to the shares and retains for himself only rights 
arising from the trust deed in respect of dividends and capital. Therefore, 
upon transfer of the shares to the trustee, the shareholder surrenders his 
rights as shareholder and becomes a trust beneficiary.5 The trustee 
acquires such rights and consequently the company has regard only for 
the trustee as the registered member. 
Any dividend paid by the company to the trustee, as the registered 
member, will constitute income in the trust estate in terms of the trust 
deed. The trust income, subject only to any special provision to the 
contrary contained in the trust deed, vests in the trustees in their capacity 
as such.6 The trust beneficiaries will have a personal right to their portion 
of the trust income only once the trustees have exercised their 
discretion, in terms of the trust deed, to apportion and distribute the 
income to them. 7 The company is not obliged to take any notice of the 
fact, even if it is aware of it, that the registered member holds the shares 
as trustee or as nominees on behalf of another.9 There is, therefore, no 
duty on the company to ensure that the trustee is paying the trust 
beneficiaries dividends received by him in terms of the trust deed.10 
4 See Fan-ar 126 where it is stated: "The shares are usually transfe"ed as there is doubt as to whether 
votes can be separated from ownership of the shares." It is submitted that there is no reason why the 
right to vote, which is a proprietary legal right, cannot be separated from the ownership of shares. 
5 Pickering 258 footnote 43, where it is stated: "It is clear, however, that where a company's shares are 
held on trnst the rights of the beneficiaries are derived from the tenns of the trnst itself, and not from 
the provisions of the company's regulations: Butt v Kelson [1952] Ch 197". 
6 S 12 of the Trust Property Control Act, 57 of 1988. 
7 Henochsberg 170 and the authorities cited. 
8 It is not certain whether the person who holds shares as a trnstee is a nominee. See Sammel v 
President Brand Gold Mining Company Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 667. It is submitted that the 
answer must lie in the proper constrnction of the trnst deed and the tenns upon which the 
shareholders transfer their shares to the trnstee. 
9 S 104; Hahlo 223; Henochsberg 169 and the authorities cited. 
10 Henochsberg 170 and the authorities cited. 
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More importantly, the trustees can exercise the votes in respect of 
shares transferred to the trust in accordance with their authority to do so 
in terms of the trust deed. A trust deed is a flexible instrument and may 
confer on the trustees an absolute and unfettered discretion to exercise 
the votes as they wish, subject only to the fiduciary duty of the trustees to 
act in the best interests of the trust beneficiaries, or it may restrict their 
authority to vote. The voting trust, in effect, confers upon the trustees a 
joint irrevocable proxy with general or restricted powers.11 Furthermore, 
the trust objects, which must be lawful, may be either general or may be 
confined to certain specific matters. 
The trust deed, unlike the voting agreement, must be lodged with and 
registered by the Master of the Supreme Court12 and is, therefore, not a 
private document. Any person who in the opinion of the Master has 
sufficient interest in the trust deed so registered with him, may inspect 
and make copies of the trust deed.13 Therefore, in order to conceal the 
identity of the real controllers of the trust, the trustees can enter a private 
voting agreement with the real controllers, whereby the trustees 
undertake to vote in accordance with their instructions. The trust 
beneficiaries could possibly attack this agreement, or interdict the 
trustees from performing their obligations in terms of this voting 
agreement, if they ever became aware of it, on the ground that if the 
trustees fetter their discretion they will be in breach of their duty to act in 
accordance with the terms of the trust deed.14 
The voting trust has many uses other than concentrating voting 
power.15 For example, where there is a close association of 
shareholders and directors with comparable status within the company 
the existence of independent trustees with powers to appoint and 
11 Hahlo 311; Ftln'ar 126; Pickering 257; Bums v Siemens Brothers Dynamo Works Ltd [1919} 1 Ch 
225; Munro v Ekerold 1949 (1) SA 584 (SWA); cf Table A art47, Table B art48; see 3.3.3 below. 
12 Hereafter refe"ed to as "the Master; s 4 of the Trnst Property Control Act, 57 of 1988. 
13 S 18 of the Trnst Property Control Act, 57of1988. 
14 Tony Honore The South African Law of Trnsts 3rd ed ( 1985) (''Honore'~ 278. 
15 Ftln'ar 127. 
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remove directors will go some way towards preventing undesirable strife 
between such shareholders and directors. Furthermore, where the 
founders of a company wish to perpetuate a policy or belief they can 
entrench this in the trust objects, simultaneously restricting the authority 
of the trustees to vote only in the furtherance of this policy or belief. In 
this way, the policy or belief can be perpetuated for as long as the trust 
deed is in existence. Finally, the trust deed itself can be amended only 
by consensus in terms of an amendment clause contained in it. 
Therefore it is easier for the trustees to safeguard the interests of the trust 
beneficiaries in a trust deed, than for the shareholders to safeguard their 
interests individually in terms of the articles.16 
The voting trust is also a potential vehicle for abuse because under it 
shareholders may surrender more of their legal rights and remedies to 
the trustees than under almost any other means of concentrating 
contro117 and not be able to control the trustees.18 If sufficient shares 
carrying the required majority of votes 19 are transferred to the voting 
trust, the trustees can acquire sufficient votes to pass resolutions in 
general meeting, thereby becoming the controllers, or at least a 
dominating influence, in the company. If directors of a company 
controlled the board of trustees of the voting trust, or were themselves 
trustees, they would, in terms of the powers conferred upon them by the 
trust deed, determine such issues as inter alia the terms of appointment 
and remuneration of directors. 20 Such a situation would be untenable if 
abused. 
Furthermore, the trustees often have little interest or personal stake in the 
success of the company resulting in them taking less responsible short 
term decisions in relation to the management of the company. Unlike 
directors, trustees, as registered members of a company, owe no 
fiduciary duty to the company.21 Instead, they have a duty to the trust 
16 Pickering 258. 
17 Pickering 259. 
18 Fa"ar 127. 
19 See 2.2 above. 
20 Pickering 258 - 9 footnote 45. 
21 See 2.1.2 above. 
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beneficiaries to act within the powers conferred upon them by the trust 
deed.22 The trust beneficiaries' remedy against the trustees in the event 
of a breach of that duty would be to claim their right to receive a dividend 
or a share in the surplus capital upon distribution thereof. 23 Whether or 
not the trust beneficiaries can prevent the trustees from voting in any 
particular way, especially if the trustees enjoy a wide unfettered 
discretion to do so in terms of the trust deed, is doubtful. 
It is therefore in the interests of shareholders, before relinquishing their 
shares to the trust, to ensure that the trust deed contains a provision 
effectively empowering them to appoint the trustees of their choice, and 
to remove any trustee who proposes to use the voting power conferred 
by the trust for his own selfish purpose or for some other corporation's 
purpose or for hostile purposes.24 
A voting trust, controlled by the directors of the company, is an indirect 
method of circumventing the company law principle that a company 
cannot purchase its own shares and be a member of itself, except in 
certain defined circumstances.25 Although this principle is primarily 
aimed at maintaining the capital of the company and thus protecting 
shareholders' investments,26 it also prevents further abuse by the 
23 See generally Honore 278- 291. 
24 Pickering 269 footnote 47; Wa"en v Pim 66 NJ Eq 353 at 375; 59 At/ 773 at 781 (1904); H W 
Ballantine ''Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulations" (1942) 21 Texas Law Review 139 at 151 -
152. 
25 S 38; Trevor v Whitworth ( 1887) 12 App Cas 409; but cf Hahlo 172 where the author states that in 
the United Kingdom, where it originated, this principle no longer applies, though it still applies in 
South Africa. In England it was held in in re Castiglione's Will Trusts [1958] Ch 549, that a 
company can hold its own shares on trust for itself. This position has been entrenched by statute in 
South Africa only in relation to employment participation schemes - see s 38(2)(b). In tenns of 
ss 159 - 181 of the Companies Act,1985, both public and private companies are now pennitted, 
provided their articles authorise it, to redeem and purchase their own shares and to be members of 
themselves; see also Farrar 163 - 176. 
26 Hahlo 170-171 and the authorities cited. 
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directors. The directors could, if they were not prohibited from doing 
so,27 use the company to purchase its own shares and be a member of 
itself. The directors of that company, it is submitted, could then exercise 
control over those shares themselves, effectively acquiring voting control 
in that company, and preventing the remainder of the shareholders of 
the company from being able to pass an ordinary resolution removing 
them from office. The directors, in effect, would be increasing their own 
powers of control at the expense of the company. 
Irrevocable proxies 
In order to acquire voting control in the general meeting a third party 1 
may approach the registered members of a company, and for a 
consideration, become their "proxy". Unless the articles otherwise 
provide, a proxy shall not be entitled to appoint more than one proxy.2 
Acquiring control by canvassing for proxies is not easily achieved for a 
number of reasons: 
A "proxy" is merely an authorisation given by a shareholder to 
another person to exercise his right to attend, speak and vote in his 
stead at any meeting of the company. 3 A proxy is therefore merely 
the agent of the shareholder who appointed him4 and has no title or 
other rights to the shares beyond the authority given him by his 
appointment.5 The authority so given, however, may be wide or it 
may be limited. In order to be effective as a means of acquiring 
1 Proxi.es may, but need not be, members of the company; s 189(1); Hahlo 297; Henochsberg 292, M 
J Oosthuizen ''Die Uitbring van Volmagstemme by die Neem van Spesiale Besluite" (1975) 38 
THRHR160. 
2 S 189(1) proviso. 
3 S 189(1); Pickering 261. 
4 Henochsberg 292; Cousins v International Brick Co Ltd [1931] 2 Ch 90 at 94. 
5 Fa"ar 127; Pickering 262; Gower 538- 541. 
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control in a company, the proxy should be authorised to vote in 
whatever way he deems appropriate, and the authority of the proxy 
must be expressed to be irrevocable, either over a period of time, or 
for stipulated meetings or resolutions only.6 
A shareholder may normally cancel the proxy either expressly or by 
personal attendance and voting.7 On ordinary agency principles, it 
is clear that as between the shareholder and his proxy, a revocation 
is always effective if notified to the proxy before he has voted, and if 
he disregards it he usurps an authority and is liable to his principal.a 
Voting at general meetings takes place on a show of hands or by a 
poll. 9 A proxy may attend, speak and vote on a poll but may not, 
unless the articles otherwise provide, vote on a show of hands.10 
On a show of hands a proxy who is entitled to vote in terms of the 
articles has only one vote, irrespective of the number of shares he 
holds or represents.11 The registered members and proxies may 
demand a vote by po1112 and therefore it is not necessary to appoint 
a different person as proxy for each registered member in order to 
acquire control by proxy. 
The danger always exists that a proxy will vote contrary to the 
authorisation as evidenced on the proxy form.13 In these 
circumstances it is uncertain whether the company may disregard 
his vote.14 Furthermore, it is not certain whether proxy holders can 
6 Fa"ar 127; Pickering 262 footnote 58; see 3.3.3.2 below. 
7 Gower 540 footnote 96. 
8 Gower 540. 
9 S 197 ands 198. 
10 S 189(1); Henochsberg 292- 293; 308. 
11 S 197(1); Hahlo 297. 
12 s 198(2). 
13 S 189(5)(b) and (6)(b). 
14 Henochsberg 293; Gower 541 footnote 2; Hahlo 319; Cousin v International Brick Ltd {1931] 2 Ch 
90 at 95, 100 and 102. 
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be compelled to attend company meetings, and apparently only if 
they are present and if there is a binding contract compelling them 
to do so, may they be compelled to exercise the authority conferred 
upon them.15 
3.3.3.6 There is nothing to prevent another shareholder from attacking the 
validity of the appointment of a proxy. Unless the articles provide 
otherwise, it is for the chairman of the general meeting to determine 
the validity of an appointment of a proxy and as to whether a proxy's 
vote is or is not to be rejected on that basis.16 
3.3.3.7 The person wishing to acquire control of the company by proxy 
must be prepared to expend time, money and effort canvassing for 
votes especially where the members are geographically widely 
dispersed. 
15 
16 
17 
The proxy making machinery is ideally suited for the directors to acquire 
control of the general meeting. The shareholders may be invited by the 
directors to complete a proxy form consenting to the nomination of one 
of the directors as proxy.18 Shareholders who are too apathetic to 
attend, or due to circumstances are unable to attend, a general meeting, 
may confirm the director's appointment as proxy. In this manner the 
directors can utilise the votes of the absentee shareholders. 
Where consideration has been given for an authority to vote, whether 
that authority is express or implied, then in effect a voting agreement has 
been created which is identical in its nature with the voting agreement 
Fa"ar 127; Pickering 263 footnote 66; Gower 540 - 541; Second Consolidated Trust Ltd v Ceylon 
Amalgamated Tea and Rubber Estates Ltd [1943) 2ALL ER 567. 
Henochsberg 294; Hahlo 318; In re Indian Zoedone Company. (1884) 26 Ch 70 (CA) at 77. 
s 189(5). 
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discussed above.18 No realistic distinction between voting agreements 
and irrevocable proxies can be founded upon the fact that the latter are 
usually, but not necessarily, entered into between the shareholders of a 
company whereas the former relationship are more often created 
between shareholders and non-shareholders.19 
3.4 Inter-company control arrangements 
A company may be a shareholder of another company.1 A "group" of 
companies may thus be created in which the shares of the various 
companies in the group are held by other companies in the group in such a 
way that the voting control is concentrated in one or more of the companies. 
A "group" of companies is not a separate legal persona but is comprised of a 
number of companies, each company being a separate legal persona. 2 It is 
therefore possible for one company in a group to trade, another company to 
retain ownership of all assets, and yet another company to manage the 
business. 
A group of companies may comprise a holding company and its 
subsidiaries, 3 or it may comprise a network of interlinking companies without 
this formal control arrangement. The basic characteristic of a group of 
companies is that the management of the companies comprising it may be 
18 See 3.3.1 above. 
19 Pickering 263. 
1 Cilliers & Benade 115; Hahlo 220; Henochsberg 168. 
2 Salomon v Salomon & Companv Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HC); Dodoo Ltd v Krngersdom Municipal 
Council 1920 AD 530; Gower 112 and 251; D H Botha ''Recognition of the group concept in the 
Company Law" 1982 De Jure 107 (''Botha'~ at 110; K Ho/setter ''Parent responsibility for subsidiary 
corporations: Evaluating European Trends" (1990) 39 International Company Law Quarterly 576; C 
Schmitthoff ''Salomon in the Shadow" 1976 Journal o(Business Law 305 at 311. 
3 See 3.4.1 below. 
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co-ordinated in such a way that they are managed on a central and unified 
basis in the interests of the group as a whole. 4 The control implicit in the 
"holding-subsidiary• company relationship which a holding company 
exercises over its subsidiaries makes it possible for the group to be managed 
in this way. 5 
The statutory recognition of the group of companies is limited to disclosure of 
the group's annual financial statements, 6 and to the abuse of control 
provisions. 7 By carefully avoiding the ambit of the holding-subsidiary 
company definition, it is possible to create group structures which circumvent 
the statutory disclosure provision and prohibitions reserved for holding 
companies and their subsidiaries. 
There are basically three "group" structures which may be used to 
concentrate voting control in one company, namely, the holding 
company-subsidiary company relationship, 8 cross-holdings, 9 and circular 
holdings.1 O 
Holding company - subsidiary company relationship 
The method of defining a subsidiary company only in terms of share 
ownership and control, or presumptions of control, based on the degree 
of integration or dependency between the companies permits a wide 
variety of group structures to be created. 
Essentially there are two definitions of a subsidiary company. The first 
definition contains two elements. A company is deemed to be a 
subsidiary of another company if that other company either is a member 
4 Gower251. 
5 Botha 108; Hahlo 69 - 73; see 3.4.1 below. 
6 s 288. 
7 S 37, s 38, s 39, s 226 and s 227. 
8 See 3.4.1 below. 
9 See 3.4.2 below. 
10 See 3.4.3 below. 
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of it and controls the composition of its board of directors, 11 or if it holds 
more than one-half of its equity share capital or if it is a subsidiary of any 
company which is a subsidiary of that other company, 13 or if 
subsidiaries of that other company, or if that other company and one or 
more of its subsidiaries, together hold more than one-half of its equity 
share capital.14 
The meaning of "control" is extended so that the composition of a 
company's board of directors shall be deemed to be controlled by 
another company if that other company may, by the exercise of some 
power,15 without the consent or concurrence of any other person, 
appoint or remove the majority of the directors.16 Furthermore, a 
company shall be deemed to have power to appoint a director where a 
person cannot be so appointed without its consent or concurrence, or a 
person's appointment as director follows necessarily from his 
appointment as director of it.17 
For the purposes of working out whether a company "holds" more than 
one-half of the equity share capital of another, shares held18 or power 
exercisable by that other company in a fiduciary capacity are 
excluded, 19 but shares held by a nominee, subject to a few exceptions, 
are included.20 The Act does not state how the equity share capital is to 
11 S 1(3)(a)(i)(aa); Henochsberg 12; Sage Holdings Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd 1982 (1) SA 337 
(W) at 350 - 352. 
12 S 1(3)(a)(i)(bb); See 2.3 above for the definition of "equity share capital'~ for a general discussion 
on the main consequences of the holding-subsidiary relationship, see Hahlo 52 - 53. 
13 S 1(3)(a)(ii). 
14 S 1(3)(a)(ii) and (iv). 
15 This includes a potential power - see in this regard Henochsberg 12; Sage Holdinr:s Ltd v The Unisec 
GrougLtd 1982 (1) SA 337 (W). 
16 s 1(3)(b). 
17 S 1(3)(b)(i) and (ii). 
18 Henochsberg submits, correctly it is submitted, at 12 that by the word "holds" the legislature means 
"is the beneficial owner of' and that the intention is that the provisions of the Act designed to prevent 
abuse of the holding company/subsidiary relationship are not to be evaded by the device of having 
nominee holdings. 
19 S 1(3)(c)(i). 
20 S 1(3)(c)(ii). 
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to be valued or counted. In the case of par value shares, one has regard 
exclusively to their nominal value and, in the case of no par value shares, 
one has regard exclusively to the value according to the stated capital 
account.21 
The definition of the "controlling-controlled• companies relationship 
includes, but is wider than, that of the •holding-subsidiary" companies 
relationship.22 Without prejudice to the generality of the term "controlling 
company", a company is deemed to control another if it holds more than 
fifty per cent of the equity share capital of that other company, or is 
entitled to exercise more than half of the voting rights in respect of the 
issued shares of that company, or is entitled, or has the power to 
determine the composition of the majority of the board of directors.23 
The definition of holding-subsidiary companies does not extend to 
control exercised by an entity which is not a company, or by a 
non-member, or by virtue of a power contained in debentures, or in a 
fiduciary capacity, or by a minority, or by means of cross-holdings of less 
than fifty per cent, interlocking directorships or any other form of de facto 
contro1.24 
A holding company, with a relatively small capital base, may therefore be 
a member of and control subsidiary companies with capital many times 
greater than the holding company.25 In this manner, it is possible to 
obtain control over many companies in which there may be, in 
aggregate, very substantial minority interests. The holding-subsidiary 
company relationship is a very powerful instrument for the concentration 
of control in the holding company. 
21 Henochsberg 12; Sage Holdin~ Ltd v The Unisec Groug Ltd 1982 (1) SA 337 (W) at 353. 
22 Hahlo 54. 
23 S 1(1) "controlled company" and "controlling company". 
24 Fa"ar490; see 3 below. 
25 Pickering 264. 
C:\CMG\GEN\JEFF .4 
920511 
3.4.2 
50. 
Cross-holdings 
One of the most important consequences of shareholders' majority 
voting control in a company, is the power to appoint and remove the 
majority of the board of directors.1 It is submitted that where a company 
is the shareholder or registered member of another company, the board 
of directors will exercise the voting rights attached to those shares in 
terms of their authority conferred by the articles. Therefore, the board of 
directors of the holding company effectively exercise the power to 
appoint or remove the majority of the board of directors of such 
subsidiary. 
Similarly, if the subsidiary company were allowed to be a member of its 
holding company then the board of directors of the subsidiary company 
would effectively be able to appoint or remove the majority of the board 
of directors of the holding company. The directors of both companies 
could maintain themselves in office indefinitely against the wishes of 
other shareholders. 
In order to prevent directors of holding and subsidiary companies 
maintaining themselves in power in this manner, a subsidiary company 
is prohibited from being a member of its holding company.2 A company 
may be a member of another company, therefore, only if it is not a 
subsidiary of that other company. 
In order to circumvent the prohibition contained in section 39 it is 
necessary to ensure that the companies in the group structure do not fall 
within the ambit of the definition of holding-subsidiary company. This is 
not difficult to achieve under existing South African law.3 Firstly, the 
companies must not hold, directly or indirectly, more than fifty per cent of 
1 Cf 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 above. 
2 s 39. 
3 But cf 2.5 above tmd the new definition in England of parent-subsidiary undertaking in the 
Companies Act, 1989. 
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the equity share capital in each other.4 Secondly, they must not be 
members of each other, and they must not •control" the composition of 
the board of directors of the other companies within the meaning of that 
expression in the definition of holding-subsidiary company.5 
The cross-holdings structure will fall outside the holding 
company-subsidiary company relationship if the various companies in 
the group formation, reciprocally, hold less than fifty per cent of the 
equity share capital in each other, are not registered members of each 
other but merely "hold" the shares through their appointed nominees, 6 
and do not control the composition of each others' boards of directors. 
Where there is a common directorship sitting on each company's board, 
or an agreement between the directors of each company, a unified 
co-ordinated group structure can be formed. 1 
Circular holdings 
The circular holdings structure is merely a variation of the cross-holding 
device. Circular holdings differ from cross-holdings in that shares in one 
company are normally only held by one other company. The suggested 
structure is that each company in the group holds shares, each less than 
a majority, in the form of a circle or chain of interests.1 
If the directors of all the inter-connected companies are the same 
persons, or agree to act in concert, they can in practice generally 
maintain themselves in office indefinitely, and against the wishes of other 
members. 
The circular ownership device differs from the cross-holding device in 
that there is no reciprocal joint majority direct and indirect interest in 
4 S 1(3)(a)(i)(bb). 
5 S 1(3)(a)(i)(aa); Sage Holdings Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd 1982 (1) SA 337 (W) at 350- 352. 
6 But cf Henochsberg 12 and 3.4.1 footnote 18 above. 
7 Pickering 265 - 6; Farrar 128. 
1 Pickering 267; Farrar 128. 
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each of the companies held by other inter-connected company or 
companies in the circle. Therefore the directors of any of the companies 
may be removed by the remaining shareholders acting together unless 
the directors acquire for themselves sufficient shares to make up a 
majority interest. Otherwise, the directors must merely accept the risk of 
holding only de facto minority control. 2 
3.5 Management contracts 
The management of a company is usually delegated by the general meeting 
to an autonomous board of directors whose appointment is based on 
election by the shareholders in general meeting.1 The terms of appointment 
of the directors may, however, be set forth in the articles, in a service contract 
entirely independent of the articles, or in a service contract which, expressly 
or by implication, embodies the relevant provisions of the articles. 2 Third 
parties may therefore be "imported" by a company to perform specific 
functions or tasks on its behalf either as agents or as independent 
contractors. The general meeting may even delegate the whole or practically 
the whole of its powers of general management to a third party, or a member, 
under an express management contract. 3 
Provision may be made in the articles for the directors to further delegate any 
or all of the powers, authorities and discretions conferred upon them by the 
company's regulations. 4 The delegation of powers may authorise further 
sub-delegation, for example, by the board of directors to a managing 
2 Pickering 267. 
1 See 2.1.1 above; cf Farrar 311. 
2 Hahlo 344 and 352. 
3 Farrar 127; Pickering 267; Cilliers & Benade 209; Gower 154-156. 
4 Table A art 80, Table Bart 79; Hahlo 454. 
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director, to whom they entrust to or confer upon such of their powers as they 
think fit. 5 A delegation to a third party of managerial powers in excess of that 
authorised by the articles cannot be enforced by that third party against the 
company.6 
The management contract between the company and the managing director 
is obviously capable of abuse in that the board of directors may be able to 
divest themselves of most of their duties and responsibilities. However, if the 
managing director in fact controls the company, he could fall within the 
definition of "director". 7 
In order to manage a company professionally the board, it is submitted, 
should be entitled to delegate management powers to qualified and 
competent third parties. The main difficulty is probably that of distinguishing 
and defining "legitimate" delegations of power to a managing agency, which 
are unlikely to be wrongfully used, from those which might be. Professional 
and technical matters generally ought to come within the former category, 
while contracts delegating to management any substantial part of the 
business should come within the latter. The definition of a "substantial part of 
any business of a company" may, if adopted, require judicial elaboration 
particularly if the management contract becomes more commonly used. 8 
Where directors have a material interest in a management contract this must 
be made known, both at the company's registry and to members. 9 
5 Hahlo 454 and 463; Pickering 267 footnote 79; Table A arts 61 - 62, Table Barts 62 - 63; In re 
Newsuauer Progrietary Syndicate Ltd {1900] 2 Ch 349 at 350; Nelson v James Nelson & Sons Ltd 
{1914] 2 KB 770 (CA) at 779; Moresby White v Ran~eland Ltd 1952 (4) SA 285. (SR) at 286; 
Harold Holdsworth & Co. (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies [1955] 1 WLR 352; [1955] 1 ALL ER 725 
(HL) at 728-730; and Anderson vlames Sutherland (Peterheads) Ltd 1941SC203 at 217. 
6 Woodlands Limited v Loflan {1948] NZLR 230. 
7 Pickering 268 footnote 82; cf Henochsberg 9 who requires a valid appointment as a director before 
recognition of director status is granted; and cf S v Vandenberg 1979 (1) SA 208 (D); Hahlo 329; see 
2.1.1 above. 
8 Pickering 268-9. 
9 S 234-s 241. 
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Chapter 4 - De facto means of acquiring control in a company 
Legal forms of control may not always be practically effective where the 
shareholders of a large company are geographically widely dispersed. In such a 
case, no one individual shareholder or definable grouping of shareholders may 
possess legal rights to exercise a majority of votes in general meeting. Usually, 
however, in most companies, some grouping or individual shareholder will emerge 
with de facto powers of control, which are virtually as real in most respects as those 
conferred by legal majority voting rights.1 
While precise definition is impossible in legal terms, three general forms of de facto 
control may be distinguished, namely, the informal agreement,2 minority control3 
and personal influence. 4 
4.1 Informal agreements 
Two or more shareholders may, on an informal basis, undertake informally to 
vote together. This informal undertaking may not be intended by the parties 
to have any legal effect and will therefore be unenforceable at law. 
Sometimes the understanding to vote together may amount to little more 
than a general tacit community of interest, particularly when it is between 
members of a family. The understanding to vote together may also take the 
form that one or more shareholders will take no active interest in the 
management of the company, but will instead acquiesce in these functions 
being carried out by others.5 
Informal agreements of this nature are often elusive and transitory in nature 
and may be readily dissolved, whether informally or by conflict of interest 
between the parties, or by changes in share ownership. Nevertheless, while 
they are in existence, they can be extremely effective as a means of 
concentrating voting control in a company, particularly in a private company 
with few shareholders. 
1 Pickering 269. 
2 See 4.1 below. 
3 See 4.2 below. 
4 See 4.3 below. 
5 Pickering 270 footnote 88. 
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Minority control 
Where there is no majority bloc or grouping of shareholders within the 
company a voting bloc of less than 50 per cent may for most purposes be 
adequate to give "working control". 6 A concentration of only a few votes may 
be adequate where there is a large membership, provided that the remaining 
votes are well divided and cast in a random manner. A small coherent group 
can in these circumstances achieve its objects and, most importantly, with as 
few as 1 O per cent of the votes can appoint their own nominees as directors. 
The effectiveness of the minority grouping to exercise voting control depends 
largely upon the indifference of the majority of members and the absence of 
any other concentration of votes. 7 
The indifference or inability of other shareholders to attend general meetings 
or to maintain an active interest in the affairs of the company, can create ideal 
conditions permitting an active minority to take over its administration, and in 
particular to maintain themselves or their representatives in office as its 
directors. 
The exact proportion of minority votes which will be sufficient to give de facto 
control of a company varies widely from company to company.a Minority 
control in the case of smaller companies is much more difficult to acquire 
and an increasingly large bloc of votes is required as the number of 
shareholders diminishes. 9 
The danger always exists that in companies with a large membership and in 
which no individual or group of shareholders have legal control, minority 
control may pass into the hands of the directors. By virtue of their position 
6 Inf act, only three-sixteenths of the total number of votes is sufficient to pass a special resolution; see 
2.2 above. 
7 Pickering 270 footnote 91. 
8 See Pickering 271 footnote 93 where it is stated: ''Among larger companies the test sometimes 
employed is that if the single largest shareholder holds 20% of the votes or more, or if the largest 20 
shareholders together hold 30% of the votes or more, minority bloc voting control may exist.·~ and 
see 2.5 above for the definition of ''participating interest" in the new s 260( 1) of the Companies Act, 
1985 inserted by s 22 of the Companies Act, 1989. 
9 Pickering 271 footnote 94. 
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and knowledge of the affairs of the company and control of its proxy-voting 
machinery, the directors have a potential unchecked power.10 Certain 
checks have been developed such as those of requirements for disclosure by 
the directors of their interest in contracts with the company,11 of their 
dealings in the shares of the company,12 and of payments for loss of 
office, 13 and the conferment upon the shareholders of the right to vote by 
proxy.14 
Minority control, by definition, may always be displaced should a larger 
group of shareholders emerge, but the practical difficulties of achieving this, 
against a united board of directors in particular, may be very nearly 
insuperable.15 
4.3 Personal influence 
One of the most important human attributes which is impossible to measure 
or define is that of force of personality. This, combined perhaps with a certain 
talent, business acumen, skill, and power of persuasion, may accord to some 
people an influence far greater in the company's affairs than that 
proportionate to their stake in its capital. By its nature, such personal 
influence is incapable of assessment or measurement in any objective sense. 
10 Farrar 311. 
11 s 234. 
12 s 230. 
13 s 227. 
14 s 197. 
15 Pickering 271 footnote 99; Gower 443 - 444 and 456 - 457. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
There are various methods of acquiring control in a company,1 namely by 
acquiring: 
1. almost complete ownership of all the shares in a company; 
2. the required majority of voting rights in general meeting through legal devices 
with or without majority ownership, for example, through holding company 
relationships and the use of capital and vote gearing, loading votes, voting 
trusts and voting agreements; 
3. minority control; or 
4. control of the management of a company. 
The scope of this dissertation was limited to acquiring control in a company 
through the exercise of the shareholders' rights to vote which, it is submitted, are 
severable from the other incidents of share ownership. 
A distinction may be drawn between forms of control founded on legally 
enforceable rights and obligations and forms of control without this basis. 2 Forms 
of control which are legally enforceable, such as categories 1 and 2 above, are 
based on rights and obligations arising from the articles or from a contract.3 "De 
facto" forms of control, such as categories 3 and 4 above, cannot be clearly 
defined in legal terms. De facto forms of control do not originate from either the 
articles or a contract, but may instead arise from an informal agreement between 
shareholders, or from minority control exercised by a group of shareholders or 
from the exercise of personal influence by one or more shareholders, or by a third 
party over the shareholders, or from a combination of these forms. 4 
1 Fa"ar9. 
2 Pickering 249. 
3 See 3 above. 
4 See 4 above. 
5 Pickering 249. 
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Both legal and de facto forms of control may be effective as a means of controlling 
a company, but, it is submitted, de facto control will become ineffective if a legal 
form of control emerges or may be ignored when a stronger personal influence or 
minority grouping forms. 5 Legal control, on the other hand, cannot be overcome in 
any of these ways, is always enforceable in a court of law, and is, therefore, a more 
satisfactory form of control. There is often an overlap between legal forms of 
control, and between legal and de facto forms of control. 
Although it would appear that the objective of any person who wishes to acquire 
control in a company would be to acquire legal control in one of its many forms, 
the trend appears to be in favour of acquiring de facto control in a company or 
control over the management of the company. This is so largely because of the 
number of and the geographic dispersion of shareholders in a large company.6 
The owners of the company, the shareholders, tend in these circumstances to 
confer control in the company to the management of the company in terms of the 
articles. With this divergence of ownership and control comes a divergence of 
interest: the shareholder is interested more in income and capital appreciation of 
his investment rather than the company as an enterprise whereas management is 
interested in the enterprise for a diversity of motives ranging from self interest to 
professional pride. 7 
It is submitted that the identity of interest between ownership and management will 
vary depending on the number and geographic dispersion of the shareholders of 
the company. In a small company with few shareholders, there will be a greater 
identity of interest between ownership and management which, it is submitted, 
usually ensures that minority shareholders do not suffer discrimination. The 
position is not the same in large companies with many shareholders where the 
owners of the company usually have little or nothing to do with the control of the 
company. The position of the minority shareholders in these circumstances is 
safeguarded to a large extent by the requirements of the Act for special resolutions 
and the provision of entrenched minority rights, the right of action for relief against 
oppression conferred under section 252, and the action at common law for fraud 
on a minority. 
6 Fa"arB-9. 
7 Fa"ar9. 
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It is submitted that the acquisition of control in a company requires firstly an 
analysis of the articles of a company. The articles usually provide for, inter alia, the 
rights of the various classes of shareholders, the procedures to be followed in 
general meeting and the division of powers between the shareholders in general 
meeting and the board of directors. These factors are important before a decision 
is made by a third party whether to acquire ownership of the company or to acquire 
control of the management of the company. In large companies with many 
shareholders, it is submitted, it would be more advisable and economic to acquire 
control of the management of the company. As the number of shareholders 
diminish, consideration may be given to acquiring ownership of the company 
through the acquisition of its shares or through one or more of the devices set out 
in the articles& or through control of the required majority of shares in terms of an 
agreement separate from the articles. 9 
Inter-company control arrangements have been increasingly brought under the 
regulation of the law, both by statute10 and by the courts. Inter-shareholder 
agreements, it is submitted, tend to become increasingly impracticable and, in J .. 
consequence, of diminishing importance as companies expand in size. Finally, the 
degree of capital gearing is always limited by the powerful curbs of market 
acceptability. 
It is submitted that the use of devices supplementary to the articles will be a more 
appropriate method of acquiring control in a "small" company .11 Firstly, the voting 
arrangement is set out in a private document which is not accessible to the 
public.12 Secondly, unlike the articles which are alterable by special resolution,13 
a contract is only alterable by agreement of all the parties to it. It is therefore 
submitted that the voting agreement, insofar as shareholders are concerned, is the 
most flexible form of aggregating voting power in a company and the shareholders 
8 See 3 above. 
9 See 4 above. 
10 See 2.5 and 3.4.1 above. 
11 See 3.3 above. 
12 Except the voting trust deed - see s 18 of the Trust Property Control Act, 57 of 1988. But see 3.3.2 for 
the other advantages of the voting trust. 
13 See 2.2 and 3.3 above 
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retain title to their shares.14 Shareholders surrender more of their rights under a 
voting trust than under any other form of control because they transfer their shares 
to the trustees and relinquish their title thereto.15 It is submitted that the voting trust 
is a useful device where a third party wishes to acquire control in a company 
because the third party can acquire title to the shares and exercise the votes in 
terms of a wide discretion conferred by the trust deed. 
Any form of control, such as class powers of appointment of directors and class 
powers of general management, should, it is submitted, be avoided because they 
may result in the company becoming unmanageable.16 
The other constitutional forms of control, namely capital and vote gearing and 
loading votes, are all useful methods which may always be utilised in appropriate 
circumstances, such as when the existing shareholders wish to retain control in the 
company but need to raise capital by the issue of new shares.17 
14 See 3.3.1 above. 
15 See 3.3.2 above. 
16 See 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 above. 
17 See 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above. 
WW 
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